

Annual Report 2024

# **LIBYA: ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE SOLUTION**

## **VIOLATIONS CONTINUE AMID IMPUNITY**

*Armed group checkpoint in Tripoli – Source: Social media*



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This annual report reflects the continuous and dedicated efforts of our team throughout the year, demonstrating our deep commitment to providing an accurate and comprehensive overview of the human rights situation in Libya. For the past three years, we have consistently released our annual report, a practice we intend to continue moving forward. This report has become an essential reference and a trusted source for both local and international entities in assessing the human rights situation in Libya and contributing to accountability efforts.

Behind this report stands an exceptional team, primarily made up of passionate activists, survivors, and former victims—individuals who carry the weight of their suffering yet remain steadfast in their belief in justice despite the risks they face. They are not academics or specialists; they are people who have endured and continue to endure the consequences of violations. It is their determination and resilience that have made this report possible despite all the challenges.

This report would not have been completed without the extraordinary efforts of our field monitoring and documentation team. Working in harsh conditions and facing threats and restrictions, they continue to carry out their work with professionalism and precision, even with limited resources.

We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to everyone who contributed to this report—from the victims, survivors, and witnesses, as well as the affected communities who trusted us and shared their stories, to the researcher who played a vital role in collecting and analysing data, and the translation and review team who ensured the accuracy and integrity of the information. We also thank all those who assisted in disseminating this report, which will undoubtedly help raise awareness and spotlight the human rights challenges in Libya.

Lastly, we wish to express our sincere appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for their continued support and trust in our work. Their support has been invaluable, materially and morally, empowering us to persist in this vital mission despite the many challenges we face.

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**Donate, be a  
voice for the  
victims!**

## ABOUT LCW

**Libya Crimes Watch (LCW)** is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation founded in 2019 and registered in the United Kingdom. It is part of the broader human rights movement in Libya. LCW focuses on monitoring and documenting human rights violations and international crimes, including extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances. LCW is committed to advancing accountability efforts, supporting victims and survivors, and advocating for human rights in Libya. Led by survivors and former victims, LCW's commitment to justice and ending impunity is embodied in its motto: *"From Survivors, Alongside Victims, For Accountability."*

LCW relies on a vast network of field monitors spread across various regions of Libya, working to reach victims, survivors, and witnesses, collecting evidence and testimonies, and conducting interviews in line with international standards. LCW also works closely with affected communities to ensure the voices of victims are heard by international bodies and strives to activate international accountability mechanisms to hold perpetrators of violations accountable.

LCW collaborates with both local and international human rights movements through an integrated approach. It participates in activities and campaigns within local and global networks and alliances, including the Libyan Platform Coalition, the SOS-Torture Network, and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the aim of achieving shared goals. Over the past year, LCW reached **499** victims and survivors, published **12 monthly reports**<sup>1</sup>, two joint reports with partners, and **over 60 advocacy posts** in support of victims. LCW also provided support and referrals to more than **10 individuals**, prepared three reports for UN mechanisms, and submitted **8 urgent appeals** to UN special rapporteurs. Additionally, **over 10 cases** were referred to international accountability mechanisms. As part of its international advocacy efforts<sup>4</sup>, LCW briefed the UN Security Council on the human rights situation<sup>2</sup> and participated in **more than 20 events**, seminars, and workshops on human rights in 2024, in collaboration with both local and international partners.

LCW remains unwavering in its commitment to defending human rights, amplifying the voices of victims and survivors, and contributing to the pursuit of justice despite the growing challenges.

<sup>1</sup> To read our monthly reports, you can access them through [the Reports page on our official website](#).

<sup>2</sup> [Libya Crimes Watch provides a briefing at the United Nations Security Council](#), LCW, 17 December 2024.

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
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## GLOSSARY

<b>LCW</b>	Libya Crimes Watch
<b>GNU</b>	Government of National Unity
<b>LAAF</b>	Libyan Arab Armed Forces
<b>HoR</b>	House of Representatives
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>ISA</b>	Internal Security Agency
<b>OTP</b>	Office of the Prosecutor
<b>GDSO</b>	General Directorate for Security Operations
<b>TBZ</b>	Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade
<b>SSA</b>	Stability Support Apparatus
<b>SDSA</b>	Security Directorates Support Agency
<b>RSDSS</b>	Regional Security Directorates Support Service
<b>DCIM</b>	Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration
<b>PSSPA</b>	Public Security and Security Positions Apparatus
<b>GASIMP</b>	General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons



**Figure 1: Regions of Serious Human Rights Violations in 2024 - LCW**

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This report, issued by Libya Crimes Watch (LCW), reveals Part<sup>3</sup> of the serious human rights violations and international crimes committed between January 1 and December 31, 2024. These violations were documented by the field monitoring and documentation team in eastern and southern Libya, within areas controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and allied armed groups, the Libyan government accredited by the House of Representatives (HoR), as well as in western Libya, in areas under the control of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and its allied armed groups and security apparatus. The report focuses on serious human rights violations, particularly international crimes, for which the authorities in both eastern and western Libya bear direct and indirect responsibility.

<sup>3</sup> The violations documented in this report reflect only what the LCW field team was able to access and verify during the reporting period and do not necessarily represent the actual or full scale of violations committed.



2. Libya continues to suffer from deep political and military division, with two rival governments vying for power, each backed by armed groups and influential security forces. This division has contributed to the persistence of serious violations and international crimes, putting civilians' lives at continued risk and fostering a climate of impunity. Meanwhile, the national judiciary remains both incapable and unwilling to investigate international crimes and hold those responsible accountable. Furthermore, arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) remain unexecuted due to limited cooperation from the authorities and ongoing divisions among them.
3. In this context, the report tracks the developments in the human rights situation compared to the previous year, 2023. The field team documented 337 serious violations last year<sup>4</sup>, some of which constitute international crimes. These violations affected 276 individuals, including 264 civilians who were subjected to violations that occurred during 2023 and 12 people who fell victim to violations committed between 2016 and 2020. In 2024, the field team monitored an increase in serious violations and international crimes compared to the previous year, with 589 violations documented, some of which amounted to international crimes. These violations impacted 499 individuals, including 313 civilians who were affected by violations occurring during the year and 186 individuals who were victims of violations committed during indefinite periods<sup>5</sup>. The violations occurred in at least 24 cities, including 11 cities in eastern and southern Libya and 13 cities in western Libya.
4. In eastern and southern Libya, the field team documented 110 civilians, including two women, a child, and migrants, as victims of at least 192 serious violations committed during the year. These violations included arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment, and deaths amounting to extrajudicial killings or unlawful killings. Our team identified 14 government entities responsible for these violations, including a military security apparatus, 5 armed groups affiliated with the LAAF, one allied armed group, and 7 security agencies under the Libyan government accredited by the HoR.
5. In eastern and southern Libya, the field team also monitored 52 civilians, including a female migrant, 5 migrant children, and several other migrants, as victims of serious violations. These violations included losses from military operations and deaths due to poor living conditions in migrant shelters (privately owned) as a result of medical negligence, especially under restrictions on humanitarian aid. Other migrants have also died from drownings at sea as well as deaths from hunger and thirst in the desert. Our team also observed the discovery of 32 bodies in a mass grave in Sirte.

<sup>4</sup> Dozens of victims were subjected to multiple serious violations.

<sup>5</sup> The report also monitors serious human rights violations and international crimes committed between 2011 and 2023, which were uncovered in 2024.

6. In western Libya, the field team documented 70 civilians, including 4 women, 5 children, and migrants, as victims of at least 81 violations committed during the year. These violations included arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment, deaths amounting to extrajudicial killings or unlawful killings, injuries from gunfire, injuries from shooting at protesters, and injuries from military operations. The documentation cases confirmed the implication of at least 20 government entities in these violations, including a security apparatus, two armed groups affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council, and 16 entities, including security agencies and armed groups affiliated with the GNU.
7. In western Libya, the field team documented 79 civilian victims of serious violations, including 3 children, 4 women, and dozens of migrants. The losses resulted from military operations, direct targeting, gunfire at civilian homes, and the drowning deaths of migrants attempting to reach Europe. Our team also discovered 65 migrant bodies in a mass grave in the Shuwayrif area, southwest of Libya.
8. The violations in eastern, western, and southern Libya stemmed from similar backgrounds, where dozens of protesters expressing their political views were targeted, as well as journalists, human rights defenders, their family members, social activists, political activists, bloggers, and their families, religious minorities, migrants who fell victim to human trafficking and smuggling, and government employees and officials. Civilians also suffered due to armed clashes in populated areas, landmines, and war remnants that remained in these areas.
9. The report concluded that systematic human rights violations, many of which may amount to severe violations and international crimes, have occurred in more than 24 cities across eastern, southern, and western Libya. Our field team identified at least 33 government entities responsible for these violations, including security and military agencies, as well as armed groups affiliated with or supporting the authorities in eastern and western Libya. The report further highlighted the responsibility of 3 key government entities for the most severe violations: the Internal Security Agency (ISA) in eastern and western Libya, armed groups, and security agencies linked to the LAAF or their supporters.
10. The documentation cases compiled by the field team confirmed the responsibility of the LAAF, under a command chain starting with General Commander Khalifa Haftar, followed by the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Saddam Haftar, and the leadership of the ISA headed by Osama Al-Darasi, which is affiliated with the Libyan Government accredited by the HoR, are responsible for serious violations, many of which constitute international crimes. These violations include arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, cruel treatment, and extrajudicial killings perpetrated against civilians as part of a policy aimed at silencing opponents, journalists, activists, and those who criticise or are believed to criticise the LAAF.
11. The documentation cases also confirmed that the ISA, headed by Lutfi Al-Harari and affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council, committed serious violations, including arbitrary



detention, enforced disappearances, torture, and mistreatment. These violations were perpetrated against civilians as part of a policy aimed at silencing opponents, journalists, activists, and those critical of the authorities in western Libya, as well as religious minorities and non-normative gender groups.

12. The report includes recommendations that urge the authorities in eastern and western Libya to take concrete steps to end the ongoing severe violations and international crimes, particularly arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, and violations against migrants and minorities. It emphasises the necessity of respecting and protecting fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, thought, conscience, and religion, and the need to hold accountable those responsible for these violations. The report also calls on international bodies, particularly the ICC, to continue investigating the crimes committed in Libya and ensure that perpetrators are not granted impunity. It further urges active states to halt any direct or indirect support to the parties involved in these violations and advocates for the establishment of an independent international investigation mechanism to strengthen accountability and justice.

## II. METHODOLOGY

13. This report is based on **62 documented cases** and **79 additional interviews** conducted by the Field Monitoring and Documentation Team between January 1 and December 31, 2024, across more than **24 cities in eastern**, western, and southern Libya, with a particular focus on hard-to-reach areas due to logistical and security reasons. The report highlights serious human rights violations and international crimes, covering issues such as arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, attacks on journalists, civil society, and activists, extrajudicial killings, military operation-related casualties, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and mass graves. It utilises excerpts from testimonies gathered to convey the human dimension of the victims' and survivors' stories, while personal information of victims, survivors, witnesses, and sources are redacted to ensure their safety and privacy.
14. The information was collected through the preparation of documentation cases and conducting interviews with victims, survivors, witnesses, victims' families, their lawyers, a local network of activists, civil society organisations, journalists, and residents. The report also relies on official documents, including court documents, medical reports, other official records, images, videos, audio recordings, trusted NGOs reports, and open-source analysis. The information was collected, stored, and used per the principles of "do no harm," confidentiality, informed and renewed consent, objectivity, and an intersectional perspective. It was archived in a secure database managed according to data management policies, adhering to minimum access standards, preventing misuse, and ensuring compliance with ethical standards.
15. The report focuses on the serious violations and international crimes for which the authorities in eastern and western Libya, as well as the armed groups and security forces supporting or affiliated with them, bear responsibility. The analysis of these violations and the attribution of accountability is grounded in international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law, with national Libyan legislation considered in specific cases. Conclusions regarding violations occurring throughout 2024 are drawn concerning violations in previous years, aiming to identify patterns, methodologies, and the scope of such violations. The process undergoes review by experts in international law, human rights, forensic medicine, and the security sector.
16. The focus on gendered impacts and addressing them was a significant challenge, especially due to limited access to women as a result of societal restrictions placed on them and other intersecting forms of discrimination, which created concerns and isolation among women, preventing them from disclosing the serious violations and international crimes they endured. Similarly, sensitivities around focusing on non-normative gender and religious groups posed a major challenge. To address these difficulties, we ensured the use of alternative advocacy

tools that were context-sensitive, ensuring that they did not jeopardise the safety of victims, survivors, or the team.

17. In its conclusions regarding potential responsibilities for serious violations and international crimes, the report relied on verified facts, confirmed information, or sufficient evidence to establish proof, primarily based on documentation processes. The names of some potential perpetrators were disclosed based on claims from victims and survivors and an analysis of the violations per international law. However, the disclosure of these names does not constitute a legal conclusion of guilt, and the report emphasises that the responsibility for investigating and holding those accountable for these allegations falls within the jurisdiction of the appropriate judicial bodies.
18. This report was developed over 15 months by a dedicated team of 15 LCW members and experts involved in research, investigation, writing, review, translation, and production. The process begins with our field team conducting year-round monitoring of human rights conditions, gathering testimonies from victims, survivors, and witnesses, and verifying violations through multiple sources. The collected evidence is compiled into documented case files, which are then analysed and archived by the Head of the Monitoring and Documentation Office. then, a team of 4 LCW members further reviews the data, conducts additional interviews and desk research, refines the report's structure, and drafts its initial version. Under the supervision of a senior expert, the team conducts a thorough analysis of the violations and formulates key findings. Once finalised, the report undergoes linguistic review, formatting, and translation before receiving official approval and publication.

### III. CONTEXT

19. Libya continues to experience deep political, security, and military divisions. The internationally recognised GNU and the Libyan Presidential Council operate in areas controlled by armed groups and affiliated security forces supporting them. In contrast, the government accredited by the HoR operates in eastern Libya, within the sphere of influence of the LAAF. Led by Khalifa Haftar, the LAAF controls most of eastern and southern Libya and derives its legitimacy from the HoR. Additionally, unaffiliated armed groups remain active in various parts of the country.
20. Military and security tensions, including exchanges of fire, persist in populated areas among armed groups, security forces linked to the LAAF, the Libyan Presidential Council, the GNU, and local armed groups not officially connected to the authorities. At least 11 armed clashes have erupted in 7 cities across western, eastern, and southern Libya, resulting in injuries and deaths of at least 13 civilians, including children and women<sup>6</sup>.
21. In western Libya, 9 clashes occurred between armed groups and security forces affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council, the Ministries of Defence and Interior of the GNU, as well as other non-affiliated armed groups. In eastern and southern Libya, 2 clashes took place between armed groups aligned with the LAAF and a security agency linked to the government accredited by the HoR.
22. The clashes stem from various underlying causes, including the arrest of a member of an armed group or security forces, attempts to pressure authorities into releasing detainees<sup>7</sup>, acts of revenge<sup>8</sup>, and efforts to expand areas of influence by seizing vital installations<sup>9</sup>. These incidents not only continue to jeopardise civilian lives but also highlight the fragmentation of Libya's security sector, revealing the central authorities' limited control over these groups and

<sup>6</sup> [United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres' Report on the United Nations Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 9 April 2024, para. 24.

[United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres' Report on the United Nations Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 8 August 2024, paras. 20, 21, 23, 24, 28.

[United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres' Report on the United Nations Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 15 December 2024, para. 23.

See:<sup>7</sup> [United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres's report on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 8 August 2024, para. 20.

[United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres's report on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 15 December 2024, para. 24.

<sup>8</sup> [Report of the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 9 April 2024, para. 24.

[Report of the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 8 August 2024, paras. 21–22.

[Report of the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 8 August 2024, para. 23.

their ongoing attempts to extend their influence for further security, political, and economic gains—all while enabling wanted individuals to evade accountability.

23. Furthermore, the influence of disreputable leaders and members of armed groups has grown across eastern, southern, and western Libya. For instance, Saddam Haftar, the de facto commander of the Tariq bin Zeyad (TBZ) brigade<sup>10</sup>, has been appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces<sup>11</sup>, while Abdul Salam Al-Zoubi<sup>12</sup>, commander of the 111th Brigade now serves as Deputy Minister of Defence in the GNU. Reports<sup>13</sup> indicate that some former members of the Al-Kaniyat group, which has been implicated in international crimes, have been integrated into the Deterrence Agency for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime (“Al-Radaa”) affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council and the 444th Combat Brigade under the Ministry of Defence in the GNU—both of which currently oversee the security of mass grave sites in Tarhuna. Moreover, former al-Kaniyat members continue to occupy positions within the city’s police and security services. Similarly, figures from the Abu Zriba<sup>14</sup> family—implicated in criminal activities in Zawiya, including human trafficking, torture, and mistreatment—remain in influential positions; Ali Abu Zriba is currently a member of the Libyan HoR, while Essam Abu Zriba holds the post of Minister of Interior in the government accredited by the HoR.
24. The growing and sustained influence of disreputable leaders and members of armed groups reflects the persistence of a culture of impunity, which legitimises their actions rather than holding them accountable and disbanding their organisations. It also points to the increasing control that armed groups are exerting over state structures, thereby hindering authorities’ ability to investigate grave human rights violations and international crimes<sup>15</sup>. The judicial system, tasked with protecting rights and enforcing the law, increasingly relies on fragmented

<sup>10</sup> The documented violations indicate that fighters affiliated with the TBZ Brigade have committed grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, amounting to international crimes, while continuing to enjoy complete impunity.

Libya: “We Are Your Masters”: Widespread Crimes Committed by the Tariq Bin Zeyad Armed Group, Amnesty International, 19 December 2022, para. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Libya: Haftar Appoints His Son Saddam as Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, Agenzia Nova, 20 May 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Al-Zoubi has been active for over 10 years within armed groups in western Libya that have committed violations against civilian populations in areas under their control.

Exploring Armed Groups in Libya, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2020, para. 58.

<sup>13</sup> Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Abuses in Libya, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, para. 36, 56.

<sup>14</sup> The Abu Zriba family is involved in criminal networks in Zawiya, western Libya, engaging in human trafficking, migrant smuggling, arbitrary detention of migrants, as well as acts of torture and ill-treatment.

The Political Economy of Zawiya: Armed Groups and Society in Western Libya, Small Arms Survey, March 2024, para. 45.

<sup>15</sup> We Die a Thousand Times a Day: Impunity for Crimes Against Humanity in Tarhuna, Libya. Amnesty International, 2024. para. 16.

and disreputable armed groups and security forces, which also control many official detention facilities<sup>16</sup>.

25. The national judiciary remains both unwilling and unable to investigate international crimes or hold perpetrators accountable. This systemic failure stems from multiple factors, including persistent threats and intimidation targeting judicial bodies, political interference, corruption within the judiciary, selective prosecution, limited enforcement capacity, restricted access to certain areas, lack of cooperation from authorities in both eastern and western Libya, and the ongoing failure of the Libyan criminal justice system to adhere to international legal standards in addressing international crimes.
26. Furthermore, Threats and retaliatory actions against judicial bodies have persisted in response to their attempts to investigate or prosecute serious crimes committed by individuals affiliated with armed groups, security agencies, authorities, or influential figures. The monitoring and documentation team documented an incident in which the Public Prosecutor in Misrata was subjected to an attempted abduction from his office by armed members of the Joint Operations Force (JOF), affiliated with the Prime Minister of the GNU. The assailants stormed the office, assaulted the prosecutor, and facilitated the escape of a detainee. Additionally, a prosecutor in Tripoli was attacked in his office, while another was targeted in an assassination attempt, during which unidentified armed individuals opened fire indiscriminately at his home and vehicle<sup>17</sup>. A military prosecutor in Sorman was also kidnapped by armed men belonging to the 103rd Infantry Battalion under the Ministry of Defence of the GNU.
27. These persistent threats and retaliatory actions, ongoing for over a decade<sup>18</sup>, underscore the judiciary's inability to protect its members and institutions. As a result, fear of reprisals has deterred judicial personnel from investigating serious crimes or holding perpetrators accountable, limiting their focus to lower-priority cases and less influential individuals<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> [Combating Corruption in Libya: Multiple Contexts and Comprehensive Policies](#), Defender Center for Human Rights (CHRDA), 24 July 2021.

<sup>17</sup> For more details: [Statement of the Libyan Association of Members of Judicial Bodies regarding the armed attack on Public Prosecutor Abdeljawad Al-Allous](#), Facebook, the Libyan Association of Members of Judicial Bodies, 23 October 2024.

<sup>18</sup> For over 10 years, members of judicial bodies have faced severe human rights violations, including killings, abductions, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances, as well as armed attacks on their facilities, including bombings and raids. These actions have severely hindered their effectiveness, as members are either fearful of handling serious cases or unable to address them.

[Human Rights and Justice Challenges in Libya After 10 Years of Revolution](#), Defender Center for Human Rights (CHRDA), November 2021, para. 45.

<sup>19</sup> In 2020, retaliatory actions and the absence of security guarantees for judicial bodies led to delays of several months in the consideration of criminal cases, due to prosecutors' fear of investigating these cases or their inability to do so.

[Secretary-General's Report on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 5 May 2020, para. 45.



Furthermore, the judiciary's impartiality has been compromised by personal ties between some of its members and political or military figures, leading to politically influenced<sup>20</sup> rulings or a failure to issue rulings altogether. This climate has enabled perpetrators to intimidate and silence opponents, obstructing investigations. Collectively, these factors have instilled fear in victims, survivors, and witnesses, deterring them from reporting serious human rights violations<sup>21</sup> and further eroding trust in the judiciary's capacity and effectiveness.

28. For example, the judiciary's persistent inability to address international crimes committed by leaders of organised crime networks remains evident, despite international allegations linking them to serious human rights violations<sup>22</sup>. These individuals continue to operate with impunity. For instance, Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf<sup>23</sup>, Commander of the First Support Squad in Zawiya under the Petroleum Facilities Guard, and Osama Al-Kuni Ibrahim<sup>24</sup>, the de facto director of Al-Nasr Detention Centre remains actively involved in human trafficking and migrant smuggling, as well as in arbitrary detention, torture, and ill-treatment—functioning within an entrenched criminal network in Zawiya.
29. Within the Zawiya network, the activities of the commander of the Naval War Academy, Abdul Rahman Milad<sup>25</sup> (known as “Al-Baidja”), continued until his assassination in September 2024 in Tripoli by armed men linked to the commander of the First Support Squad under the Zawiya's Security Directorate, Mohammed Bahroun, who is also active in the network<sup>26</sup>. In 2017, the Attorney General issued an arrest warrant against him on charges of affiliation with

<sup>20</sup> [Combating Corruption in Libya: Multiple Contexts and Comprehensive Policies](#), Defender Center for Human Rights (CHRDA), 24 July 2021.

[Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Abuses in Libya](#), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, para. 55.

<sup>22</sup> For international sanctions imposed by the Security Council on individuals and entities related to Libya, [Sanctions List Materials on Individuals and Entities Concerning Libya](#).

<sup>23</sup> [Narrative Summary of Reasons for Sanctions Against Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf \(LYi.025\)](#), Security Council, last updated 10 April 2023.

<sup>24</sup> [Narrative Summary of Reasons for Sanctions Against Osama Al-Kuni Ibrahim \(LYi.029\)](#), Security Council, last updated 25 October 2021.

<sup>25</sup> [Narrative Summary of Reasons for Sanctions Against Abdel Rahman Milad \(LYi.026\)](#), Security Council, last updated 7 June 2018.

In 2022, Libyan Attorney General Al-Siddiq Al-Sour issued an order lifting travel restrictions imposed on Abdel Rahman Milad.

For more details: [Report of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on the Situation in Libya](#), Security Council, 13 December 2024, para. 43.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

the Islamic State (“ISIS”)<sup>27</sup> which was later cancelled in July 2020<sup>28</sup>. In September 2024, Bahroun surrendered himself<sup>29</sup> after being accused of Al-Baidja’s assassination.

30. In June 2024, Abdul Raouf Al-Kabo (known as “Abdu Al-Kabo”), the leader of the Kabowat group and one of the most prominent figures involved in murder, human trafficking, and drug smuggling in western Libya<sup>30</sup>, was released after being arrested by order of the Attorney General. His arrest triggered armed clashes in Zawiya between the 52nd Brigade of the Ministry of Defence of the GNU and drug traffickers loyal to Al-Kabo until he was released within hours—marking the second time he has been arrested and then released<sup>31</sup>.
31. Leaders within the authorities in eastern and western Libya who collude in war crimes and crimes against humanity<sup>32</sup> committed in Tarhuna by the Al-Kaniyat group during periods when it was affiliated<sup>33</sup>, have continued to evade accountability. International reports indicate that the authorities in western Libya were aware of the crimes committed in Tarhuna during the period when they provided support between 2015 and 2018<sup>34</sup> and that most of the mass

<sup>27</sup> [Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, United Nations Security Council](#), 8 March 2021, para. 7.

<sup>28</sup> [The Political Economy of Zawiya: Armed Groups and Society in Western Libya](#), Small Arms Survey, March 2024, Endnote 32, para. 63.

<sup>29</sup> Bahroun attempted to evade accountability by fleeing Libya; however, he later returned and voluntarily surrendered. The findings of the investigations into his case remain undisclosed to date.

[United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres' Report on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 15 December 2024, para. 22.

<sup>30</sup> [Libya: Who is Abdu al-Kabo, the Militia Leader Arrested for Drug and Human Trafficking](#), Agenzia Nova, 6 July 2023.

<sup>31</sup> After al-Kabo's arrest in 2023, the commander of the 103rd Infantry Battalion (“Al-Selaa”), Othman Al-Lahab, affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of the Government of National Unity, negotiated with the Libyan Attorney General, Al-Siddiq Al-Sour, for his release. Al-Kabo was ultimately released by January 2024.

[The Political Economy of Zawiya: Armed Groups and Society in Western Libya](#), Small Arms Survey, March 2024, Endnote 86, para. 66.

[Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya](#), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, para. 54.

<sup>33</sup> Between 2015 and 2017, the militia was active in leading the Tarhuna Security Operations Room under the military authorities in western Libya. From 2017 to 2018, the Al-Kaniyat group was integrated into the Presidential Guard Brigades under the decision of the Minister of Defence of the Government of National Unity, No. (13/2017), as part of the 7th Infantry Brigade. In August 2018, the Presidential Guard issued a statement disowning the group. In March 2019, the group was integrated into the Libyan Arab Armed Forces under the 9th Brigade until it disbanded in March 2020.

[Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya](#), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>34</sup> Victims have claimed that they reported the violations committed by the militia after its integration into the forces of the Government of National Unity and that the government ignored these reports due to political interests.

[Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya](#), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, Para. 53.

Additionally, authorities in western Libya provided support to the militia to gain its loyalty, including the National Salvation Government led by Khalifa Ghweil and the Government of National Unity led by Fayez al-Sarraj.

graves discovered in the city were dug between 2019 and 2020, while the group was affiliated with the LAAF as the 9th Brigade<sup>35</sup>. Despite this, the investigations by the Libyan Attorney General were limited to the group's leaders and members. Although arrest warrants were issued against 400 individuals, only 51<sup>36</sup> were detained, as the wanted individuals fled abroad or to eastern and southern Libya, where the LAAF protected them from judicial prosecution<sup>37</sup>.

32. An international report<sup>38</sup> noted that relatives of the Al-Kaniyat victims continued to file official complaints between 2012 and 2020 regarding the crimes committed by the group, yet the public prosecutors in Tripoli and Tarhuna either took no action or delayed taking any measures. No official investigations into the crimes were announced until after the group left Tarhuna in 2020. The report also pointed to allegations of selectivity by the Attorney General, who focused investigations on crimes believed to have been committed after the group joined the LAAF in April 2019. This suggests that political motives influenced the cases, as evidenced by the ongoing failure to properly investigate and hold accountable the crimes committed by other armed groups and security forces affiliated with the authorities in western Libya or those with shared interests.
33. Based on the Libyan judiciary's unwillingness and inability to investigate and hold accountable international crimes, the ICC issued 6 arrest warrants, which were disclosed in October 2024<sup>39</sup>, against leaders of the Al-Kaniyat group—including Abdurahem Khalefa Abdurahem Elshgagi aka Abdurahem AL KANI, Makhlof Makhlof Arhoumah DOUMAH, Abdelbari Ayyad Ramadan AL SHAQAQI, Fathi Faraj Mohamed Salim AL ZINKAL, Nasser Muhammad Muftah DAOU, and Mohamed Mohamed AL SALHEEN SALMI—on charges of war crimes such as murder, torture, cruel treatment, sexual violence, and rape. In December, the Court also issued an arrest warrant against the director of the Maitiga Prison in Tripoli, Osama Najim<sup>40</sup>,

Detailed Findings on the Situation in Tarhuna, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission, 1 July 2022, para. 38.

<sup>35</sup> Detailed Findings on the Situation in Tarhuna, The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission, 1 July 2022, paras. 56, 163.

Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, pp. 16, 22.

<sup>36</sup> We Die a Thousand Times a Day: Impunity for Crimes Against Humanity in Tarhuna, Libya, Amnesty International, 2024, para. 50.

<sup>37</sup> Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024, para. 58.

<sup>38</sup> We Die a Thousand Times a Day: Impunity for Crimes Against Humanity in Tarhuna, Libya, Amnesty International, 2024, pp. 48-51.

<sup>39</sup> Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.A. Khan, on the unsealing of six arrest warrants in the Libya situation, International Criminal Court, 4 October 2024.


<sup>40</sup> The Situation in Libya: Arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Osama Al-Masri Najim for crimes against humanity and war crimes, International Criminal Court, 22 June 2025

on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, rape, and sexual violence.

34. In November, the 444th Combat Brigade, affiliated with the Ministry of Defence under the GNU, announced the arrest of Mohamed Mohamed AL SALHEEN SALMI<sup>41</sup>, whom the ICC wants. However, he has not yet been surrendered to the Court, hampering efforts toward justice. Other wanted individuals continue to evade accountability, as the implementation of the Court's orders faces numerous challenges—notably, the limited cooperation of Libyan authorities amid political and security divisions. Moreover, these individuals enjoy protection from armed groups, security forces, and governmental figures in both eastern and western Libya.
35. Given the persistent failure to enforce arrest warrants, coupled with the enduring reluctance and incapacity of Libyan authorities to hold accountable those responsible for international crimes, and the escalating entrenchment of these perpetrators within state structures, and with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) aiming to conclude its investigations in Libya by the end of 2025<sup>42</sup>, this situation will exacerbate the culture of impunity, encourage the commission of further international crimes, and leave the victims with no opportunity to access justice.

<sup>41</sup> [Post regarding the arrest of Mohammed al-Salheen](#), Facebook, the 444 Brigade's, 23 November 2024.

<sup>42</sup> [The 26th Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1970 \(2011\)](#), International Criminal Court, 8 November 2023.



**Figure 2: Toll of Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance in 2024 - LCW**

## IV. ARBITRARY DETENTION AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

36. LCW has documented a significant rise in arbitrary detention in 2024 compared to 2023. Last year, 109 cases of arbitrary detention were recorded, including 52 individuals who were subjected to enforced disappearance. However, in 2024, the field monitoring team documented 139 arbitrary arrests, with 74 cases of enforced disappearance. These arrests occurred across multiple cities, including Tripoli, Ajdabiya, Sabratha, Al-Bayda, Al-Qatrun, Misrata, Al-Marj, Yefren, Benghazi, Derna, Sirte, Shahat, Sebha, Tarhuna, and Jufra.
37. The violations followed similar patterns across eastern, western, and southern Libya. Among those arrested were 44 protesters, 15 bloggers, 3 relatives of bloggers, 11 government officials and employees, 8 community figures, 3 journalists along with 2 of their family members, 4 political activists, and 1 human rights defender along with a family member. Additionally, at least 14 individuals from religious minorities were arrested, as well as 3 others detained for their perceived support of the former regime, including a poet. Another 2 individuals were arrested for unknown reasons.

## Eastern and Southern Libya

38. A total of 98 documented arbitrary arrests took place in eastern and southern Libya throughout the year. Among those arrested were 2 women, and 1 child. These arrests were conducted by security agencies affiliated with the Libyan government accredited by the HoR, including the ISA, as well as the General Directorate for Security Operations (GDSO), and The General Administration of Criminal Investigation. all operating under the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, armed groups and security units affiliated with the LAAF were responsible for several arrests, including the Tariq Bin Zeyad Brigade (TBZ), the 115th Infantry Battalion, the 128th Brigade, the 166th Infantry Brigade, the 106th Brigade, and the Military Police and the Prison Administration.

### *The ISA affiliated with the Libyan government Accredited by the HoR*

39. The ISA, led by Osama Al-Darsi and affiliated with the Libyan government accredited by the HoR, conducted 44<sup>43</sup> arbitrary arrests targeting bloggers, journalists, protesters, supporters of the former regime, community figures, government employees and officials, political activists, and family members of the victims. Our field team documented 44 of these cases, including 2 women and 2 children, across the cities of Benghazi, Sebha, Hun, Sirt, Al-Marj, Derna, Ajdabiya, Jufra, and Murzuq.
40. Most of the detainees were detained without legal procedures and transferred to the ISA's facilities in various cities or unofficial prisons under its control. Some, including a child, were transported via military aircraft to unofficial prisons in Benghazi. LCW documented testimonies about the death of a detainee inside one of the ISA's prisons in Ajdabiya<sup>44</sup>, as well as cases of enforced disappearance, torture, and ill-treatment. The detainees were not presented with clear charges, were forced to sign false interrogation records under threat without being allowed to read them, and were denied communication with their families and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, the homes and family members of detainees were raided, arrested, and their property confiscated. One survivor stated:

<sup>43</sup> Twenty-one of the detainees were arrested in coordination between the ISA and an armed group affiliated with the LAAF. Of these, 13 detainees were apprehended in coordination with the 128th Brigade, five others with the General Department of Criminal Investigation, and two more with the 166th Infantry Brigade. Additionally, one detainee was detained in coordination with an unidentified entity within the LAAF.

The ISA has become a primary tool relied upon by the LAAF to arrest its opponents and critics, thereby shifting responsibility for violations and international crimes away from the General Command. Over the past year, the ISA's capabilities have expanded significantly, with the enlargement of its headquarters in the Sidi Hussein area of Benghazi. Moreover, over 100 military personnel previously affiliated with the 128th Brigade, under the de facto command of Saddam Haftar, the head of the LAAF's ground forces and son of the General Commander Khalifa Haftar, were transferred to the ISA's investigation and arrest unit.

<sup>44</sup> For more details, [LCW monitored the death of Ahmed Abdel-Monem Al-Zawi](#) on Facebook, LCW, 20 July 2024.



“

I was driving home, just like every day, but that night was different. Suddenly, I found myself surrounded by four cars blocking my way. I couldn't process what was happening. They told me they were from the Internal Security Agency, and within moments, I was in their vehicle. They covered my face, my breathing quickened, and I trembled with fear, drowning in questions about why I was being arrested.

Minutes passed before the car stopped somewhere, and they ordered me to get out. My legs could barely hold me up. In moments, I found myself in a solitary cell that felt like a grave, no more than four meters wide. It was nearly pitch black, with only a small window letting in a faint breath of air. The toilet was in the corner, a silent surveillance camera loomed over me, and in front of me lay a thin mattress—nothing else but fear and uncertainty.

The air was suffocating, my body drenched in sweat. I struggled to breathe, trying to grasp what had happened. They left me there for an entire day without telling me why I was there. I begged them to inform my family, but no one responded. The next morning, the cell door swung open, and a military officer blindfolded me, tied my hands behind my back, and led me to the interrogation room.

I stood facing the wall as the head of the Interrogation Unit, Ridwan Al-Wadawi, stood behind me. For three hours, he interrogated me about posts and comments I had written on social media criticizing the country's living conditions and the authorities, threatening me with a long imprisonment. This became my daily routine for the next four days.

One day, they brought two other detainees into my cell. We had to take turns sleeping, as each of us barely had a meter and a half of space. The guards forced us to stand from morning until 8 PM, monitoring us through the cameras, waiting for any sign of exhaustion. If we sat or spoke, they threatened us with beatings. We could hear screams from other cells, the thud of batons striking bodies, knowing our turn was coming.

And then, it was our turn. After I spoke to one of my cellmates, the guards stormed in, dragged me outside, and restrained my legs. They began beating the soles of my feet without pause—one baton rose as the other struck down. I lost count of how many times it happened.

I remained in prison for months, never expecting there to be an end to this. But one day, the cell door opened. A guard ordered me out, blindfolded me, and led me to a room where I was forced to sign an interrogation report without being allowed to read it. I also signed a pledge not to share news or what they called "incitement" on social media. And just like that, I was finally outside again.

*Omar (pseudonym)*

### ***Qarnada Prison Complex*** <sup>45</sup>

41. Throughout the year, at least 41 civilians were detained at the Qarnada Prison Complex for reasons related to their political views, participation in peaceful gatherings and demonstrations, religious practices, or accusations of "witchcraft and sorcery." LCW field team documented the arbitrary arrest of 13 civilians, including a minor, in a prison overseen by the TBZ Brigade within the Qarnada Prison Complex, managed by Mohammed bin Idris Al-Tajouri—both affiliated with the LAAF. These individuals were detained following their participation in demonstrations on September 1st in support of the former regime. The arrests took place in September in the town of Zillah, North of Jufra, conducted by the ISA's Hun branch, affiliated with the HoR accredited Libyan government, alongside the 128th Brigade of the LAAF.
42. They were held for several days at the ISA's facility in Hun before being forcibly transferred—without their families' knowledge—on September 6th via a military aircraft from the Jufra Airbase, under LAAF control, to Benghazi. There, they were detained at a prison under the TBZ Brigade within the Qarnada complex and subjected to enforced disappearance. After 78 days of arbitrary detention, they were released on November 18th. LCW documented testimonies of detainees facing ill-treatment and being forced to chant slogans in praise of LAAF General commander Khalifa Haftar, including "Long live Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar." They also endured periods of detention without being presented to a prosecutor, were denied contact with their families, and were deprived of legal representation.
43. Our field team also monitored the arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of at least 28 civilians, including 2 women and 4 followers of Sufi orders, at an unofficial prison overseen by the LAAF within the Qarnada Prison Complex. They were detained under accusations of "witchcraft and sorcery"<sup>46</sup> as part of a wave of arbitrary arrests that began in January, led

<sup>45</sup> It is located in the Qarnada area, south of the city of Shahat, and is primarily composed of three prisons: the civilian prison, under the supervision of the Judicial Police Authority of the Ministry of Justice; the military prison, overseen by the Military Police and Prisons Administrations of the LAAF; and the TBZ Prison, an unofficial prison managed by the TBZ brigade under the LAAF.

<sup>46</sup> In early 2024, the Libyan HoR passed [Law No. \(06/2024\) titled "Combatting Sorcery, Witchcraft, Divination, and Similar Practices."](#) This law violates international standards and includes penalties that can reach the death sentence. It contains vague definitions, charges, and methods of proof that are used against religious minorities in Libya, including Sufis, Ibadis, and other groups, based on their religious practices. The law is part of the agenda of the Salafi Madkhali movement, which has played a prominent role in pressuring for its enactment. This movement holds significant political, social, military, and security influence both domestically and internationally, including through the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs in eastern Libya and the General Authority for Endowments and Islamic Affairs in western Libya.

initially by the Security Directorates Support Agency (SDSA)<sup>47</sup> under Mahmoud Abuhiri<sup>48</sup>, and later by the GDSO under Jamal Al-Amami—both agencies affiliated with the HoR backed Libyan Ministry of Interior. These detainees continue to be denied family visits and access to legal counsel, with their families left unaware of their fate.

44. The victims were detained in the cities of Sirte, Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Al- Marj, and other towns in eastern Libya. Before being transferred to Qarnada, most of them were detained for about a month in an unofficial prison run by the GDSO in the Ras Al-Mangar area of Benghazi, where they were subjected to enforced disappearance, torture, and ill-treatment. Some were also forced to make coerced confessions, which were then published on the official platforms of the GDSO<sup>49</sup>, as part of the policy used to incite against them and justify the campaign of arbitrary arrests.
45. Among the detainees, our field team documented the case of Sheikh of the Qadriyyah Sufi order<sup>50</sup>, Sheikh Muftah Al-Amin Al-bijou (79 years old), who was arbitrarily arrested on February 4th from his farm in Benghazi by armed men affiliated with the SDSA. His family was assaulted by them, including threats against women and children, destruction of household property, and looting. Al-bijou was subjected to enforced disappearance for approximately three months before his family was informed of his detention location.

## Western Libya

46. A total of 38 documented arbitrary arrests occurred throughout the year in West Libya, all of which involved men, conducted by security, military, and armed groups affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council and GNU. These included the ISA, the Deterrence Agency for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime ("Al-Radaa"), the Criminal Investigation Department, the Public Security and Security Positions Apparatus (PSSA), and the Regional Security Directorates Support Service (RSDSS) of the GNU, and the Central Mountain Security Directorate and Battalion 130 under the Ministry of Defence.

<sup>47</sup> In mid-November 2024, the Minister of Interior of the Libyan Government accredited by the HoR dissolved the SSDA and merged its units into the GDSO under the leadership of Jamal Al-Amami. The head of the dissolved authority, Mahmoud Abuhiri, was appointed to manage the Benghazi branch of the GDSO.

<sup>48</sup> The leaders of the authority, including Saleh Asweiri (who is responsible for carrying out arrests and interrogations), belong to the Madkhali Salafi movement

<sup>49</sup> [Post of Confessions of Individuals Arrested on Charges of Witchcraft and Sorcery](#), Facebook, the General Directorate for Security Operations Benghazi Branch, 22 November 2024.

<sup>50</sup> A Sufi order. For more details: [The Qadiriyya order, Encyclopaedia Britannica](#).

### ***The Internal Security Agency affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council<sup>51</sup>***

47. LCW documented testimonies of detainees held by the ISA who were subjected to enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment, violence, and sexual assault, which included forced anal examinations and sexual harassment. Detainees were also deprived of contact with their families and access to legal counsel and were held for prolonged periods without being presented to the prosecutor. They were coerced under threat to sign interrogation reports containing false confessions. Additionally, detainees' personal belongings were looted, their family members were threatened and intimidated, and the ISA continued to extort detainees, publishing their coerced confessions on its official platforms to intimidate, humiliate, incite against, and defame the detainees, particularly targeting vulnerable groups such as religious minorities.
48. The ISA's policy throughout the year continued to involve referral to the prosecutor as a means to prolong detention. We also observed the continued complicity of public prosecutors with the ISA, as they ignored and neglected to address the torture detainees reported to them, accepting interrogation reports containing confessions extracted under torture. Additionally, throughout the year, detainees who had been arbitrarily detained had their detention extended for months under the pretext of continuing investigations.
49. The ISA, headed by Lutfi Al-Harari and affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council, conducted arbitrary arrests against demonstrators, bloggers, journalists, civilians from religious minorities, and government employees. Our field team documented 24 such cases, which occurred in the cities of Tripoli, Tarhuna, Bani Walid, and Sabratha. One of the survivors stated:

“

I was driving my car as usual when suddenly, three civilian cars surrounded me from all sides. An armed man forcefully opened my car door, began shouting my name, and then grabbed me by my shirt, pulling it over my face and dragging me toward his car. They sped off without me knowing where we were headed. His grip on my neck never loosened as he forced me to keep my head down. I tried to track the road, but there was no opportunity.

Within minutes, I found myself in front of the Internal Security Agency headquarters in Al-Deribi. The armed man dragged me inside, then threw me into an underground cell. It was completely dark and silent. I could hear screams coming from the upper floor, and fear gripped my body, making me feel like I was next—soon enough, they confirmed it.

<sup>51</sup> Two divisions of the ISA are active in Libya. The political and security division has led to the agency's split, with the division in eastern and southern Libya operating under the Libyan government accredited by the HoR, while the division in western Libya falls under the Libyan Presidential Council.

The door to the cell opened, and someone blindfolded me. They took me upstairs to begin the interrogation. The investigator started asking questions, while others began beating me with sticks whenever my answers displeased them. The interrogation lasted for at least four hours, and I don't think there was a curse word I hadn't heard by the end of it. Afterward, they ordered me to stand in front of a camera, gave me a script to read, and began filming. I later saw the video posted on the agency's social media pages after my release.

That was the pattern for the next five days, after which the interrogation stopped until my referral to the prosecutor. On the thirteenth day, one of the guards took me to an office on the upper floor, where they covered my head with a trash bag and forced me to sign the interrogation report and place my fingerprints. Soon after, I was transferred to the prosecutor's office. I quickly began telling the prosecutor what had happened to me, showing him how my body was covered in bruises from the torture. He showed no reaction, instead continuing to charge me with the same accusations and ordering my referral to prison.

*Saeed (pseudonym)*

50. Among the detainees, in August, the Director of Information Technology at the Central Bank of Libya, Musab Mohamed Msallem, was arbitrarily arrested by armed men affiliated with the ISA near his home in Tripoli. He was taken to the ISA's headquarters in the Al-Deribi area west of the city, where he was held for hours before being released without any legal procedures. In the same month, five other employees of the bank were also arbitrarily arrested by armed men affiliated with the ISA, and taken to the ISA's headquarters in Al-Deribi, where they were subjected to enforced disappearance for several days before being released without legal procedures. These arbitrary arrests were part of the ongoing conflict between the authorities in western and eastern Libya for control of the Central Bank of Libya<sup>52</sup>.
51. In September, 7 civilians from the cities of Sabratha, Bani Walid, Tarhuna, and Tripoli were arbitrarily arrested by individuals affiliated with the ISA. They were taken to the ISA's headquarters in Al-Deribi. Their arrest followed their participation in pro-regime demonstrations on September 1st, during which they posted videos and photos on social media showing their involvement. They were charged with "insulting state symbols." The ISA released a video of the victims, where they made confessions about their participation in the demonstrations, as part of the ISA's policy to intimidate, humiliate, and defame detainees<sup>53</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> For more details: [Report of the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, on the United Nations Mission in Libya](#), Security Council, 8 August 2024, para. 2.

<sup>53</sup> For more details: [Confessions of 7 civilians who were arrested for their participation in pro-Gaddafi regime protests](#), 5 September 2024, available on the ISA's Facebook page.

### ***The Deterrence Agency for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime ("Al-Radaa")***

52. The LCW field team documented the continued violations against detainees at Mitiga Prison, which is controlled by the Deterrence Agency for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime ("Al-Radaa"), headed by Abdel Raouf Kara and affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council. The violations included arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment, forced labour, unfair trials, and the continued policy of intimidation against released detainees to prevent them from contacting human rights organisations or revealing the violations and international crimes committed within Mitiga Prison. This has hindered efforts to document and expose these abuses. The field team also observed the continued detention of hundreds of detainees without being presented to the prosecutor, or despite having received release orders, acquittals, or having served their sentences.
53. Among the individuals who were not brought before a prosecutor, the field team documented the ongoing arbitrary detention of a Sudanese migrant, now entering its fifth consecutive year. He was initially arrested in 2019 by the Al-Radaa Force on charges allegedly linked to affiliation with the LAAF charges that appear to be either fabricated or unsupported by any clear legal basis. Following his arrest, he was subjected to enforced disappearance for three years, during which time his family believed he had died. It was not until 2022 that they discovered he was being held at Mitiga Prison. Despite a formal complaint submitted by the Sudanese community in Tripoli to the Libyan Attorney General, and follow-up correspondence from an international organisation addressed to the Libyan authorities, he remains in arbitrary detention to this day.
54. Al-Radaa also perpetrated an arbitrary arrest against a member of the family of a human rights activist<sup>54</sup>. Our field team documented the arbitrary detention of Ahmed Fathallah Al-Hawari (35 years old) in January by armed men affiliated with the Al-Radaa in the Al-Deribi area, west of Tripoli. This arrest was intended to pressure his brother, human rights activist Nasser Al-Hawari, who had fled Libya, to force him to return and surrender himself.
55. Ahmed Al-Hawari was released after 7 days of enforced disappearance, during which he was held at Mitiga Prison ("Al-Radaa") in the Souq Al-Juma area east of Tripoli. The prison is managed by officers from the Judicial Police, who are effectively under the control of the Al-Radaa, alongside personnel directly affiliated with the Al-Radaa. It is run by Osama Njim, who is wanted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

### ***The Central Mountain Security Directorate and the 130th Battalion***

56. The Central Mountain Security Directorate, under the management of Nasser Al-Nakoua and affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the GNU, in coordination with the 130th Battalion of the Ministry of Defence of the GNU, conducted an arbitrary arrest campaign against

<sup>54</sup> For more details: [Report: Human Rights Violations in Libya During January 2024](#), LCW, 1 February 2024.



protesters in the city of Yefren, south of Tripoli. LCW field team documented, between October and November, the arbitrary detention of 10 men in the city, and the injury of another by gunfire, following their participation in a peaceful demonstration protesting the presence of armed groups in the city. The arrests included a member of the municipal council and 2 city elders, who were taken to the Central Mountain Security Directorate's headquarters before being released after a few days.

## V. ATTACKS AGAINST CIVIL SOCIETY, ACTIVISTS, AND JOURNALISTS

57. The authorities in both eastern and western Libya have continued to pursue repressive policies targeting civil society and curtailing the rights to freedom of expression and opinion. National legislation that contravenes international legal standards, such as the Anti-Cybercrime Law and the Anti-Terrorism Law, which remains in force and is frequently used to suppress civil society activities and stifle dissent. Notably, a comprehensive legal framework to regulate and protect the work of civil society organisations is still absent. Journalists and civil society actors are particularly vulnerable, facing defamation campaigns, incitement by state-affiliated actors, and arbitrary detentions. These practices have fostered a climate of fear, leading to widespread self-censorship, especially among women and marginalised groups. As a result, many organisations and independent media outlets have been forced to suspend their operations or shift their focus to less sensitive areas. Furthermore, these violations have contributed to ongoing instances of forced mass displacement, exacerbating the already fragile human rights situation in the country.
58. During 2024, LCW monitored a continuation of arbitrary arrests against journalists, civil society and activists. In 2023, LCW documented the arrest of 25 civilians, including journalists, civil society activists, bloggers, as well as political and social activists. In 2024, the field team documented 26 such cases. Particularly concerning were instances of retaliatory arrests targeting relatives of journalists and activists. LCW documented the arbitrary detention of six family members—one woman and five men—in what appears to be a form of collective punishment. These arrests occurred across several cities, including Benghazi, Misrata, Tripoli, Yefren, Sebha, and Murzuq.

### East and South of Libya

59. Among the arbitrary arrests of journalists in eastern Libya, conducted by the ISA under the Libyan government accredited by the HoR, was the detention of journalist Ikram Rajab and her parents. The field team documented in September the case of Ikram Rajab (30 years old), who was arbitrarily arrested in Benghazi by individuals affiliated with the ISA and subjected to enforced disappearance for two days. Her family, including a child, was subjected to physical assault and threats by personnel from the ISA after they raided her home in the Salmani neighbourhood. Personal belongings of Ikram were seized. In October, her father (72 years old) and mother (64 years old) were arbitrarily arrested after they went to the ISA's headquarters in the Sidi Hussein area of Benghazi to demand information on their daughter's whereabouts. They were all released within days of their arrest in the same month.

60. In October, the ISA also carried out the arbitrary arrest of another journalist. The field team documented the case of Mohamed Al Sureet, a 42-year-old journalist and Libya affairs analyst for The New York Times, who was arrested by ISA personnel from a café in central Benghazi. His arrest appeared to be directly linked to his public criticism of forced evictions and the demolition of homes in the city centre. Following his detention, Al Sureet was subjected to enforced disappearance and held incommunicado for 18 days, during which his whereabouts were unknown. He was released without charge.
61. Al-Sureet's detention came in the context of a campaign of forced evictions in central Benghazi, supervised by the 20/20 Brigade, led by Ali Al-Mishai, affiliated with the TBZ Brigade of the LAAF. The residents of central areas, including Sidi Kharibish, Al-Sabri, and Al-Jiliana in Benghazi, were assaulted by armed men from the 20/20 Brigade and were forced to leave their homes. Their neighbourhoods were besieged for weeks because some residents refused to vacate their homes. Residents, including women and children, were subjected to physical assault and threats. Some were also arbitrarily detained for hours to pressure them into abandoning their homes.
62. Among the arbitrary arrests of activists in southern Libya, in April, the ISA in Sebha detained Sheikh Ali Misbah Abu Sbeih (77 years old), a prominent community figure in southern Libya, from his home in the Qarda Shati neighbourhood of Sebha. The arrest occurred after he posted a message on his personal Facebook page supporting Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's candidacy in the Libyan presidential elections. The next day, he was transported by military aircraft from the Tamenhint military base north of Sebha, under the control of the TBZ Brigade, to the city of Benghazi. He was subjected to enforced disappearance until his release 91 days later after his arbitrary detention.

## West of Libya

63. In western Libya, in July, the ISA of the Libyan Presidential Council arbitrarily arrested journalist Ahmed Ahmed Al-Sanussi near his home in Tripoli and took him to the ISA's headquarters in the Al-Deribi area. This occurred after his return to Libya, following threats and extortion faced by staff members at the "Sada" economic newspaper, which he manages, from the ISA and the Minister of Economy of the GNU. The newspaper's editor-in-chief was also summoned for questioning by the agency. During his detention, Al-Sanussi was subjected to torture, ill-treatment, and sexual violence.
64. Al-Senussi's arrest was linked to a complaint filed against him by the Minister of Economy of the GNU, Mohamed Al-Hweij, after Al-Senussi published documents exposing corruption

within the ministry. The complaint was based on the Anti-Cyber Crimes Law (05/2022)<sup>55</sup> and the Publications Law (76/1972)<sup>56</sup>, accusing him of publishing private documents without official permission, misleading the public, inciting against the state's interests, and undermining stability. He was released after three days by order of the prosecutor, and the ISA published a video on its official platforms showing coerced confessions<sup>57</sup> in which Al-Senussi apologises to the authorities, as part of the ISA's policy of intimidation, humiliation, and character assassination of detainees.

<sup>55</sup> [Law No. 5 of 2022 on Combatting Cybercrime, 27 September 2022](#), Libyan House of Representatives 27 September 2022.


Article (4) of the law defines what it considers "legitimate use" as: "Use of the international information network and modern technology tools is lawful unless it results in a violation of public order or public morals."

For more details on the law: [Briefing Paper: The New Cybercrime Law Exacerbates the Culture of Impunity](#), 17 November 2022, Joint Statement by the LAN and the World Organisation Against Torture.

<sup>56</sup> [Law No. 76 of 1972 on Publications, 24 July 1972](#). Revolutionary Command Council, 24 July 1972.

For more details on the law: [An Overview of Freedom of Thought and Expression in Light of Libyan Legislation](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 August 2008.

<sup>57</sup> For more details: Post featuring the confessions of [Ahmed Al-Senussi](#), Facebook, The Internal Security Agency, 16 July 2024.



**Figure 3: Toll of Extrajudicial and Unlawful Killings in 2024 - LCW**

## VI. EXTRAJUDICIAL AND UNLAWFUL KILLINGS

65. LCW documented a rise in violations amounting to extrajudicial or unlawful killings in 2024 compared to 2023. The field monitoring and documentation team recorded 23 cases of such violations in 2023, whereas in 2024, the number increased to 35 cases. These incidents occurred in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Zawiya, Al-Ajilat, Sorman, Misrata, Sebha, and Tripoli.
66. Among the victims were 3 women, 4 children, and 22 men, including 3 members of the same family, a political activist, a protester, two followers of Sufi orders, six migrants, and a student at the Misrata Air Defence College. The causes of death included torture, deliberate medical neglect, direct gunfire, indiscriminate fire, and explosions from remnants of war and landmines.

### Deaths in Detention Facilities

67. 13 cases of Extrajudicial and Unlawful killings documented throughout the year in eastern Libya occurred inside prisons, detention centres, and security agency headquarters affiliated with the Libyan government accredited by the HoR. These include the main headquarters of the ISA in Benghazi, its branch in Ajdabiya, and an unofficial prison under the GDSO. Cases

were also documented in Qarnada Military Prison and Kuweifiya Military Prison, both under the administration of the Military Police and Prisons Authority of the LAAF.

***Detention facilities of the ISA under the government accredited by the HoR***

68. 4 civilians died after being held in prisons operated by the ISA, under the leadership of Osama Al-Darsi and affiliated with the Libyan government accredited by the House of Representatives, following their arbitrary detention during the year. These deaths occurred in facilities that included unofficial detention centres administered by the ISA in the cities of Ajdabiya and Benghazi. In April, the field team documented the death of political activist and researcher Siraj Fakhr Al-Din Dughman under suspicious circumstances inside an unofficial detention facility located within the ISA headquarters in the Sidi Hussein area of Benghazi. His death occurred approximately 200 days after he was subjected to arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance alongside four other activists. Their detention was reportedly based on a malicious complaint concerning their peaceful activism and their participation in private meetings to discuss Libya's political situation and electoral process.
69. After his death, the ISA issued a statement<sup>58</sup> accusing Dughman of working to overthrow the LAAF and claiming that his death resulted from falling from a high place while attempting to escape detention. Despite this, his family was not allowed to see his body or obtain an independent forensic report. After 329 days of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, the four activists arrested alongside Dughman were released, appearing in poor health.
70. The LCW field team also documented the killing of Ashraf Hamad Omar Al-Mesmari (34) in June at the same prison, just one day after his arbitrary arrest, along with 4 other civilians, following their participation in protests against the cancellation of a football match. He was taken to an unofficial detention facility at the ISA's headquarters in Benghazi and remained forcibly disappeared until his family received a call from the ISA informing them of his death without providing any explanation. Similarly, Adel Al-Zrouq Qadeer (58) died in January in the same prison, one day after his arbitrary arrest without any stated reason. He remained forcibly disappeared until his family received a call from the ISA notifying them of his death without any explanation. Upon receiving his body, his family discovered signs of torture.
71. Ahmed Abdel Moneim Al-Zawi, aged 44, died in July within the ISA prison in Ajdabiya, three days following his arbitrary arrest. He had been detained after visiting the ISA's headquarters to inquire about the condition of his imprisoned brother. Several days later, his family was notified of his death, with the ISA alleging that he had died by suicide through hanging. However, upon receiving his body at Mohammed Al-Muqrif Hospital in the city, his family

<sup>58</sup> For more details: [Statement from the Internal Security Agency regarding the death of activist Fakhr Al-Din Dughman](#), Facebook, The Presidency of the Internal Security Agency, 20 April 2024.

observed bruises on his head, raising suspicions regarding the cause of death. Three days after his death, the elder of his tribe publicly called for an investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death and for those responsible to be held accountable. However, on the fourth day, the elder appeared in a subsequent video, seemingly expressing gratitude<sup>59</sup> towards the ISA and its head, Osama Al-Darsi, suggesting that he may have been coerced or threatened—an act that fits into the broader pattern of intimidation employed by the ISA against the families of victims who seek justice or speak out

### ***GDSO Prison***

72. As part of a mass arbitrary arrest campaign targeting over 30 civilians on charges of "practising witchcraft and sorcery," the field team documented the deaths of 3 detainees in November. Among them were a Palestinian woman and two men belonging to Sufi orders. They died inside an unofficial detention facility in the Ras Al-Mangar area of Benghazi, operated by the GDSO under the leadership of Jamal Jumaa Al-Amami and affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the HoR-accredited Libyan government. The 3 had been arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared for several days before their families received phone calls notifying them of their deaths<sup>60</sup> and instructing them to collect their bodies from Benghazi Medical Centre. The bodies showed visible signs of torture. The GDSO denied requests for forensic examinations and refused to provide medical reports detailing the cause of death or official burial permits. The victims' families were also threatened into silence, prevented from speaking about the incident and barred from holding funeral or mourning ceremonies.

### ***Kuweifiya Military Prison***

73. In February, 2 detainees died inside Kuweifiya Military Prison, which operates under the leadership of Jumaa Al-Mahhashash and falls under the jurisdiction of the Military Police and Prisons Administration, headed by Najib Balt<sup>61</sup> affiliated with the LAAF. The field team documented the deaths of Sanousi Ahmed Zeidan (57) and Al-Siddiq Madhkur Al-Farjani (56) due to deliberate medical neglect. Both men had been arbitrarily detained for seven years by armed forces affiliated with the LAAF in Benghazi and Derna.

### ***Ajdabiya Security Directorate***

74. In December, Adel Abdell Salam Muftah Al-Werfali (44) died after enduring two consecutive days of torture at the Department of Information and General Investigations at the Security

<sup>59</sup> For more details: [Sheikh of the Al-Zawi Tribe retracts blaming the Internal Security Agency for the death of Al-Zawi](#), Facebook, the human rights activist Nasser Al-Hawari, 27 July 2024.

<sup>60</sup> [Statement: Libya Crimes Watch condemns extrajudicial killings in an unofficial prison in Benghazi](#), LCW, 29 November 2024.

<sup>61</sup> He is the former director of the Qarnada Military Prison, serving from mid-2014 until May 2016.



Directorate of Ajdabiya, which is under the Ministry of Interior of the Libyan government accredited by HoR. Led by Hamed Al-Ghanai Al-Qadhafi, before his death, Al-Werfali appeared before the Ajdabiya Public Prosecution, where Prosecutor Mahdi Abdullah Mahmoud Al-Shafai interrogated him. Visible signs of torture were apparent on his body, yet the prosecutor ignored his complaints and transferred him to the Ajdabiya Rehabilitation and Correctional Facility. There, he lost consciousness and fell into a coma before being transferred to Martyr Mohamed Al-Muqrif Hospital on December 6. He died nine days later from a brain haemorrhage.

### ***Qarnada Military Prison***

75. Our field team continued to document the ongoing arbitrary detention of civilians at Qarnada Military Prison, and we collected testimonies regarding the deliberate medical neglect of detainees. These individuals face torture, resulting in serious injuries or life-threatening illnesses, and are then subjected to intentional medical neglect. They are only transferred to the hospital when it becomes clear that they have little to no chance of survival, and only after obtaining direct approval from the General Command of the LAAF or the affiliated General Staff.
76. In April, Khaled Muftah Qteisha (57) died at Qarnada Military Prison, which is under the control of the TBZ brigade and the Military Police and Prisons Administration of the LAAF. He died after developing cancer in prison, with his family not being informed and deliberately denied treatment. He passed away after being transferred to the 1200 Hospital in Benghazi. Qteisha was arbitrarily detained in 2017 by the ISA in Derna, following the LAAF control of the city, after appearing in a video protesting the targeting of civilians in Derna<sup>62</sup>. After his arrest, he endured a period of enforced disappearance, was not presented to the prosecutor, and was denied family visits and communication with his lawyer.

### ***Women's Section at Sebha Reform and Rehabilitation Facility***

77. In November, Zahra Jumaa Wardaqo (33), an inmate in the women's section at the Sebha Reform and Rehabilitation Facility, which is part of the Judicial Police under the GNU, died after being tortured by prison guards and fellow inmates. This torture resulted in severe bruising and injuries. Her family found her body the following day in the morgue at Sebha Medical Centre.

## **Direct Targeting of Civilians**

78. The LCW documented the killing of 6 civilians and the attempted killing of 2 others, including 3 women and a child, after they were directly targeted by 4 security agencies, armed groups

<sup>62</sup> For more details, on the armed targeting of civilians in the city of Derna: [Libya Protect Civilians under siege in Derna](#), Amnesty International, 11 June 2018.

affiliated with the GNU, and an unknown armed group. These incidents occurred in the cities of Tripoli, Al-Ajilat, Sorman, Zaw and Yefren.

79. In July, gunmen from RSDSS the Al-Ajilat area, led by Ali Al-Jabari and affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the GNU, killed Dhou Omar Bilayblo (63), his wife Khadija Saleh Al-Said (50), and his grandson Zain Al-Kilani (5), and seriously injured his daughter. This occurred after gunmen fired directly at them while they were in their car near their home in Al-Ajilat. In September, the Libyan Public Prosecutor's Office ordered the detention of 4 suspects<sup>63</sup> in connection with the crime, but the results of the investigations have not been announced yet.
80. In November, Seif Al-Haq Mustafa Samhoud, the principal of Sorman Central School, died after being shot in front of the school in the centre of Sorman by unknown assailants riding in a military vehicle. In the same month, in Tripoli, a woman died, and a man was injured after gunmen from the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council and led by Ali Al-Jabari, fired at their vehicle in the Ghout Shaal area in the western part of the city. Also in November, Rassem Mohamed Al-Harari was killed after being shot by gunmen affiliated with the 103rd Infantry Battalion of the Ministry of Defence under the GNU. His body was found inside his car in the village of Nasser, south of Zawiya.

<sup>63</sup> For more details: [The Public Prosecutor Office orders the detention of those responsible for the killing of citizen Dhou Omar Beliyblo, his wife, and his grandson,](#) Facebook, the Office of the Public Prosecutor – State of Libya, 9 September 2024.

## VII. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS

81. The LCW documented an increase in civilian casualties and injuries resulting from military operations in 2024 compared to 2023. The field monitoring and documentation team recorded 20 cases of civilian casualties, including injuries and deaths, due to military operations in the previous year. In 2024, the field team documented 32 cases, including 16 deaths and 16 injuries, primarily caused by indiscriminate fire during armed clashes in densely populated areas. Additional casualties resulted from landmine explosions and remnants of war. These military operations have been carried out in the cities of Tripoli, Zawiya, Zuwara, Benghazi, Sebha, Jufra, and Al-Ajilat, affecting a total of 4 women, 11 children, and 21 men, including 6 migrants.

### Armed Clashes

82. The LCW field team documented the killing of 4 civilians and the injury of 11 others, including 3 children, 3 women, and a migrant, as a result of indiscriminate fire during 4 armed clashes that erupted in densely populated areas in the cities of Zawiya, Tripoli, and Zuwara. Responsibility for these incidents lies with three armed groups and a security agency affiliated with the GNU, as well as drug and human trafficking gangs.
83. In Tripoli, 11-year-old Nihal Al-Fateh Al-Sadiq was killed after being shot by gunfire while passing through the Krimiya area in May. The area, located in southern Tripoli, is densely populated and was the site of clashes between the 3rd Infantry Brigade, led by Ramzi Al-Lafa and affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of the GNU, and the PSSA, led by Abdullah Al-Trabelsi under the Ministry of Interior of the GNU.
84. Abu Ajila Mohammed Al-Nafati (55 years old) died ten days after being shot in the head near his home in Tajoura, east of Tripoli, during heavy-weapon clashes between the Al-Shahida Battalion ("Sabriya Battalion"), led by Abdulmuti bin Ramadan, and the Rahbat Al-Durou' Battalion, led by Bashir Khalfallah, both affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of the GNU. The clashes also resulted in a child being injured by shrapnel after stray bullets struck his home in Tajoura. Despite receiving distress calls from civilians requesting evacuation from the conflict areas, the Ambulance and Emergency Service was unable to enter the area on the first day due to the lack of safe corridors for civilian evacuations. The service was only able to access the area the following day, successfully evacuating 64 families who had been trapped in the crossfire<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>64</sup> [Emergency Medicine: Evacuation of 64 families trapped in conflict zones in Tajoura \(Video\)](#), available on the Wasat Gate, 10 August 2024.

85. Following another clash that erupted in July in the city between the same two battalions, also in the Tajoura area, Rabia Rahouma Beitra (51 years old) died after being shot in the head while she was in her car near one of the conflict zones in Tajoura. She fell into a coma and passed away in October of the same year. The clashes also resulted in the injury of a woman after stray bullets struck her home in the area.
86. In May, 3 civilians, including a child, were injured due to indiscriminate fire as clashes broke out in the city of Zawiya between the SSA ("Western Branch"), led by the SSA's deputy head, Hassan Abu Zariba, affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council, and the First Support Squad, commanded by Mohammed Bahroun, affiliated with the Zawiya Security Directorate under the Ministry of Interior in the GNU. The clashes also resulted in damage to civilian buildings and vital infrastructure, including homes and a power generation station. In February, in the city centre, a man and a woman were injured by indiscriminate fire during clashes between criminal gangs near Al-Daman Street.
87. In March, a member of the Zuwara Municipal Council, Shukri Rouiha, was shot in the shoulder as a result of indiscriminate fire in the city of Zuwara, near the Ras Jdir border crossing between Libya and Tunisia. Clashes erupted over control of the crossing between the Law Enforcement Administration of the GDSO, affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the GNU, and armed groups in the city. Additionally, a young girl in Zawiya was injured by shrapnel after stray bullets struck her home, while a migrant man was wounded by indiscriminate fire. These incidents occurred during armed clashes in the city between the Zuwara Military Operations Room and the 55th Infantry Battalion, both affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of the GNU.

## Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Explosions

88. The LCW field team documented the deaths of 8 civilians and the injury of 9 others, including 2 migrants, due to landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) explosions in civilian areas in the cities of Tripoli and Jufra. In August, 6 men, including four migrants, were killed when remnants of war exploded while they were collecting scrap iron and copper in Tajoura, east of Tripoli. The incident occurred at a site previously used by the Al-Shahida Battalion ("Sabriya Battalion"), which had been vacated and demolished days earlier after being taken over by the Rahbat Al-Duru' Battalion, led by Bashir Khalfallah. In November, Ahmed Ali Bashir Al-Sharif (33 years old) and Ahmed Misbah Al-Koum lost their lives after triggering landmines while attending a sports event in the Ti Ti area near Waddan, north of Jufra. 3 others were seriously injured, with one of them suffering a leg amputation.
89. In the southern areas of Tripoli, a man sustained severe injuries in January due to a landmine explosion on his farm in Ain Zara, resulting in the amputation of one of his legs and a hand. In another farm in the same area, two migrants sustained moderate injuries from landmine explosions while working. In May, in the Airport Road area, 3 children were seriously wounded when landmines exploded in their home's courtyard. These explosions occurred in

former conflict zones from the Tripoli War (2019–2020)<sup>65</sup>, where armed groups affiliated with the LAAF and their allied factions, including the Wagner group<sup>66</sup>, contaminated at least 720,000 square meters of Tripoli’s outskirts with landmines and explosive traps, most of them in residential areas<sup>67</sup>.

<sup>65</sup> The Tripoli War, which took place between April 2019 and June 2020, was fought between the Libyan Arab Armed Forces and armed groups loyal to the Government of National Accord.

For more details: [Stopping the War for Tripoli](#), International Crisis Group, 23 May 2019.

<sup>66</sup> A private Russian military security company linked to the Russian government and operating as a support group for the LAAF.

[Libya: Russia’s Wagner Group Set Landmines Near Tripoli](#), Human Rights Watch, 31 May 2022.

<sup>67</sup> [Libya: Landmines, other war hazards, killing civilians](#), Human Rights Watch, 27 April 2022.

## VIII. MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

90. Violations against migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers continued throughout the year. The field team recorded the deaths of 121 migrants due to drowning at sea, starvation, and dehydration along smuggling routes or collective expulsions to remote desert areas. Many also died as a result of torture and medical neglect. These incidents occurred in the cities of Tobruk, Sabratha, Zawiya, Tripoli, Ras Lanuf, Khoms, Sirte, Zliten, and Sorman. The recorded deaths included 3 women, 5 children, 72 men, and 41 unidentified individuals. Additionally, 65 migrant bodies<sup>68</sup> were discovered in a mass grave in Wadi Al-Abyad, located in the Al-Shwerif area in southwestern Libya. They had died while attempting to cross the Libyan desert.
91. During the year, our field team documented 22 testimonies from migrants who were detained for ransom demands from their families or for human trafficking. These testimonies revealed the inhumane conditions of detention for migrants in facilities run by armed groups, security agencies affiliated with authorities in eastern and western Libya, as well as individuals and groups linked to them. The detainees, especially in detention facilities in the cities of Zawiya, Zuwara, Tripoli, and Benghazi, reported cases of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment, and human trafficking.
92. The documented violations and crimes occurred in more than 8 detention facilities, including prisons run by the Ministry of Justice of the GNU, and the Libyan government accredited by the HoR. These also involved migrant detention centres operated by Libya's Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM) and the Border Guards, both under the Ministry of Interior of the GNU, which are de facto overseen by criminal networks. Additionally, there were human warehouses managed by armed groups and security agencies affiliated with the LAAF and the Libyan Presidential Council.

### Human Trafficking

93. The LCW field team has monitored the connection between armed groups, security, and military forces with international human trafficking and migrant smuggling networks responsible for severe human rights violations and international crimes against migrants in Libya, including murder, torture, and abduction. These networks have primarily operated in the cities of Tobruk, Bani Walid, Zuwara, Zawiya, Qara Bolley, and Al-Shuwairf. They have managed to carry out their activities with impunity due to their connections with authorities in both eastern and western Libya.

<sup>68</sup> [Mass grave containing 65 bodies of migrants discovered in Libya](#), International Organization for Migration, 22 March 2024.

### ***Zuwara Networks***

94. These networks primarily operate in the city of Zuwara, located in the northwest of Libya, engaging in human trafficking and migrant smuggling. They have connections with security forces and armed groups in their areas of influence, which extend from the city of Zuwara to the Libyan-Tunisian border. This includes the Special Task Force ("The Masked Unit") and the Border Guarda of the GNU. They are also connected to other networks in southern, eastern, and central Libya, where migrants are transferred or sold from one group to another until they eventually reach their areas of influence. Once they arrive, they are detained in secret facilities under their control, where they await smuggling trips across the sea to Malta or Italy, with costs reaching at least \$5,000 per person.
95. Zuwara networks are also active in purchasing migrants from detention centres with the aim of trafficking them or extorting their families. They are held in secret facilities where they are subjected to torture and ill-treatment, with the goal of forcing them to pay a ransom of up to 2,000 USD for their release. Some detainees have been subjected to murder and forced labour. Our field team documented the testimonies of 4 victims who stated that the Border Guards of the Ministry of Interior of the GNU sold them to smuggling and human trafficking networks from the city of Zuwara after they were unable to pay the ransom for their release while being held in the Al-Asa detention centre, which is supervised by the unit. One of the survivors Shared:

“

I packed my belongings and decided to escape from Sudan. I was exhausted from waiting for my death every day, and from the news of the massacres being committed in the cities. I had no choice but to head into the desert. I arrived in Libya and began thinking about my next steps for survival, but soon I was arrested in the city of Zuwara by the city's security forces, who sold me, along with my friend, to an armed group I didn't know. I believe it was connected to a government entity!

They took us to a large house on a farm in the city, where I was forced to work without pay. Around 50 other migrants from different nationalities were held there. The torture never stopped. The people in charge of the place would beat my body with chains and plastic water pipes. They tore off my fingernails, stripped me of my clothes, and threatened to rape me. They filmed my torture and sent the videos to my family to force them to pay a ransom for my release.

They killed two others due to the torture and medical neglect. I watched them die in front of me, and they took them to an unknown place. I can't forget the five others who were left to die, barely able to move. I still can't forget Mohammed. His body was covered in blood, and his legs were broken after they beat him with sharp tools.



Every time my family didn't respond after about two months, they decided to let me go. I quickly left the city, but I am still unable to return to Sudan, as we lost our home, and my family sought refuge in another country, and I lost contact with them. I remain stuck in Libya, living in constant fear of being arrested.

*Hamed (pseudonym)*

### **Tobruk Networks**

96. These networks primarily operate in the city of Tobruk, located in the northeast of Libya, engaging in human trafficking and migrant smuggling. They are linked to armed groups affiliated with the LAAF, most notably the 20/20 Battalion in Tobruk, commanded by Nouri Bouheida, which oversees the activities of transporting migrants between detention facilities. They also facilitate smuggling operations across the sea to Greece and Italy, often using dilapidated and overcrowded boats. Our field team recorded the recovery of 32 bodies of migrants, including children, who drowned at sea after attempting to be smuggled by the Tobruk networks.
97. Tobruk networks also have extensive influence extending across southeastern Libya, starting from the Libyan-Sudanese border, reaching the Libyan-Egyptian border, and up to the Green Mountain region. They possess the capability to transport and detain migrants within their areas of influence, managing human warehouses in several cities, most notably Tobruk and Ajdabiya. They hold significant sway in determining and utilizing the main migration routes by sea from Tobruk, particularly the Tobruk seaport, which is controlled by the 20/20 Battalion headquarters in the city.
98. Among the Tobruk networks, the Senini network is active, with one of its prominent leaders being Munseff Atiyah Ahmida Senini, and his brother Akram Atiyah Ahmida Senini ("Abu Saleh"). Our field team collected testimonies from 2 victims who confirmed that they had attempted to reach Italy via smuggling through the Senini network for \$4,500 USD. After arriving in Libya, they were detained in farms and stables managed by the network in areas including the towns of Imsaad, east of Tobruk, and Bir al-Ashhab, south of the city, as well as other facilities in Ajdabiya and the Green Mountain region. Both testimonies confirmed their detention in overcrowded facilities, with over 1,000 migrants held in one location, including children and women. The migrants were also subjected to theft, degrading treatment, and torture, including beatings with sticks, deprivation of food and water, and the spread of contagious diseases. They were transported between locations in degrading conditions, including being crammed into vehicles and transported in gasoline tanker trucks.
99. The Senini network has used its military roles and connections with individuals affiliated with the LAAF, especially the 20/20 Battalion in Tobruk, as a means to facilitate smuggling operations and the detention of migrants, while avoiding crackdowns by authorities in eastern Libya against smuggling and human trafficking networks in the city. Victims have told

us that members of the 20/20 Battalion in Tobruk receive payments in exchange for facilitating the network's activities. Furthermore, the Senini network is part of a larger network that is managed by a military official in the city of Benghazi.

## Death of Children Due to Medical Neglect

100. Between September and October, our field team monitored the death of 3 Sudanese migrant children in a migrant shelter (privately owned) in the city of Sebha, southern Libya, due to medical neglect, lack of medical care, and unsanitary living conditions. This occurred in the context of the Libyan authorities' neglect in providing support and care for migrants in the city, as well as the restrictions imposed by authorities in eastern Libya on the work of international humanitarian organisations, including assaults on their staff and restrictions on their movement and access to areas. These limitations hindered their ability to respond to the humanitarian needs of migrants in southern and eastern Libya.

## Conditions of Detention Facilities

101. Migrants in Libya are detained in over 30 facilities, including both official and unofficial prisons and detention centres, overseen by authorities in both eastern and western Libya. This includes DCIM, headed by Mohammed Al-Khouja, and the Border Guards, headed by Mohammed Al-Mahrahani, both under the Ministry of Interior of the GNU. Many of these facilities are controlled by criminal networks, some of whose members are linked to authorities in eastern and western Libya. The detention of migrants is exploited for financial gain through arbitrary detention or abduction for ransom, as well as human trafficking and smuggling. Notable facilities this year included the Al-Asa Detention Centre south of Zuwara, the Al-Nasr Detention Centre, the Bir Ghanem Detention Centre in Zawiya, and the detention centre at the Jliana Port, which is operated by the 20/20 Battalion of the LAAF, part of the TBZ Brigade.

### *Al-Asa Detention Centre*

102. The Al-Asa Detention Centre is located near the Libyan-Tunisian border, in the town of Al-Asa, south of Zuwara. It is managed by the Border Guards of the Ministry of Interior of the GNU and is controlled by armed groups from the city of Zintan, which have significant influence along the Libyan-Tunisian and Libyan-Algerian borders. In the last two years, the detention centre has emerged as a major point for gathering migrants who are being forcibly expelled from the Tunisian border to the Libyan border<sup>69</sup>. Our field team collected testimonies from 4 victims who said that the Tunisian Border Guard had transported them illegally from Tunisia to Libya, replacing them with Libyan Border Guards in exchange for barrels of oil.

<sup>69</sup> For more details: [Expulsion of migrants to the border: A violent deterrence system](#), Inkifada, 24 May 2024.

103. Witnesses further stated that detainees suffer inhumane conditions at the Al-Asa Detention Centre, where migrants, including pregnant women, are subjected to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, murder, torture, mistreatment, medical neglect, deprivation of food and water, and theft of personal belongings. This is done in order to pressure them into forcing their families to pay a ransom for their release, which reaches about \$3,000, or as a form of punishment. The field team documented a victim's testimony, who told us that he witnessed the deaths of two men due to hunger, torture, and medical neglect. He also mentioned that among the detainees were pregnant women, whose screams he sometimes heard without knowing what was happening to them in a nearby detention area.

### ***Al-Nasr Detention Centre***

104. Also known as ("Osama Prison,"), located in the city of Zawiya and was controlled during the year by criminal networks from the city, part of which is the Zawiya Support Unit under the command of Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf<sup>70</sup>, Commander of the First Support Squad in Zawiya under the Petroleum Facilities Guard, Hassan Bouzriba, commander of the Zawiya Stabilization Support Service of the Libyan Presidential Council, and members of the Libyan Coast Guard. The detention centre run by Osama al-Koni Ibrahim<sup>71</sup>, by whose name is known as the common name of the detention centre.
105. Our field team documented 2 testimonies from victims regarding the inhumane conditions at the Al-Nasr Detention Centre, where migrants, including women and children, are subjected to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and the theft of their personal belongings. They are also subjected to torture and mistreatment, including severe beatings, being stripped of their clothes, forced labour, deprivation of medical treatment, food, and water, overcrowding, poor ventilation, and the spread of contagious skin diseases. These conditions are used to pressure detainees and their families to pay a ransom for their release or as a form of punishment. Among the victims we were informed about, more than 50 Bangladeshi migrants were beaten with wooden sticks and plastic pipes for hours, almost daily for months, by other migrants working inside the detention centre under the management's supervision. During the torture, their families were contacted so they could witness the abuse in an attempt to pressure them to pay a ransom of up to \$16,000 USD per detainee.
106. Our field team documented testimony from a witness who stated that in one of the rooms inside the Al-Nasr Detention Centre overseen by a person named "Abu Saddam," three detainees developed severe skin infections due to being deprived of medical treatment for months after contracting a contagious skin disease. The witness mentioned that their skin

<sup>70</sup> [Narrative Summary of Reasons for Sanctions Against Mohammed Al-Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf \(LYi.025\)](#), Security Council, last updated 10 April 2023.

<sup>71</sup> [Narrative Summary of Reasons for Sanctions Against Osama Al-Kuni Ibrahim \(LYi.029\)](#), Security Council, last updated 25 October 2021.

turned black, and he saw maggots coming out of it. He also said he saw detainees suffering from liver problems and exhibiting symptoms of tuberculosis, yet they did not receive medical care. Additionally, some detainees, including himself, were being sold to human trafficking networks. He also informed us that women from sub-Saharan Africa are separated from women from the Middle East and North Africa, with the sub-Saharan African women being subjected to rape and harassment by the detention centre supervisors and held in mixed-gender rooms.

107. The individuals responsible for the Al-Nasr Detention Centre have connections with the Libyan Coast Guard in the city of Zawiya. The Al-Nasr Detention Centre's management, in collaboration with the Coast Guard, oversees migrant smuggling operations. Within its premises, there are human warehouses where migrants are held and prepared for sea journeys to Italy. Three victims, whose testimonies were documented, reported that the Centre's management exploits hundreds of detained migrants for various tasks. These include overseeing other detainees, granting them access to weapons for intimidation and security purposes, coercing or allowing them to torture fellow migrants, and facilitating phone calls and ransom payments.

#### ***Bir Ghanam Detention Centre***

108. A detention centre for migrants located in the Bir Ghanam area in the city of Zawiya. It is controlled by organised crime networks, including armed groups and security forces from the cities of Zuwara and Zintan. Our field team documented two testimonies from victims during the year regarding the inhumane conditions at the detention centre, where migrants, including minors, are subjected to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and mistreatment, including severe beatings and medical neglect, all aimed at pressuring their families to pay a ransom for their release. The detention conditions at the detention centre are also marked by extreme overcrowding, leading to the spread of infectious diseases. In September, we were informed of the death of one detainee by suicide, and another detainee attempted suicide during the same period by trying to hang himself. One of the survivors stated:

“

I was arrested at sea after attempting to reach Italy, and they took me to the Bir Ghanem Detention Centre. Before I got there, I had heard horrific stories about it from my fellow passengers on the boat, one of whom had been detained there twice. As the coast guard boat approached the harbour and the land seemed closer, the fear inside me only grew stronger.

When we arrived at the detention centre, they took us into a large metal building that resembled an animal pen. There were about 500 people in a space no bigger than 1,000 square meters, which meant there were barely two meters for each of us. They treated us like animals. There were no mats to sleep on, so we spread a filthy blanket on the floor

to sleep. The bathrooms were filthy, half of them out of order, overflowing with sewage water. The heat was unbearable, making it hard to breathe. Despite the presence of four or five air conditioners in the facility, the metal structure of the building turned it into a giant oven.

From the first day, I started feeling extremely weak. The food and water were disgusting, and I couldn't swallow anything without immediately vomiting. My body started to collapse, and I could no longer move without someone carrying me. I begged the guards to take me for treatment, but they showed no concern for my condition. I stopped eating as my illness worsened, and I started vomiting blood every time I ate, but the guards would beat me with sticks whenever I refused to eat.

On the third day, I began banging on the door, demanding to be released. I was too ill to even sleep. They took me to a small clinic-like cart in the yard of the centre, and I tried to explain my condition to the doctor. He said to me, 'Don't you want to go back to the sea? You deserve what's happening to you,' and left me without examining me. Afterwards, they left me in the yard, sleeping on the ground under the scorching sun. I tried to reach the water faucet about 10 meters away to wet my body and relieve the heat a little, but I collapsed before I could get there. The guards watched me but didn't move. When I begged one of them for help, he slapped me in the face, and I fell to the ground.

Mud covered me, and I could see worms and flies crawling on my body as the sun burned me. Blood started coming out of me with my urine. By the fifth day, one of the guards took pity on me, and they finally released me. After going to the hospital, I found out that I had suffered acute kidney failure and fluid buildup in my lungs, and I was admitted to intensive care for several days. The doctor there told me that I was lucky to have survived. I continued treatment until I recovered, but I still suffer from the complications of the illness to this day.

*Salim (pseudonym)*

### ***Detention Facility Operated by the 20/20 Battalion***

109. During the year, our field team documented 5 testimonies about the inhumane conditions experienced by migrants, including children, in an informal detention centre at the Jalianna port in Benghazi, run by the 20/20 Battalion of the TBZ Brigade of the LAAF. The detainees, held arbitrarily, are subjected to enforced disappearances, seizure of their personal belongings, ill-treatment, and physical torture, including beatings. They are deprived of medical care, food, and water, all as a means of pressuring their families to pay a ransom for their release. The detention conditions at this facility are also characterised by severe overcrowding and the spread of infectious skin diseases. One survivor shared:

“

After the killing of my family members and my arbitrary detention, I began my journey to find a safe place. Libya was the passage for me. A few days after I arrived, I was arrested along with my 10-year-old child by armed men affiliated with the 20/20 Battalion after our boat crashed on the way to Europe. I watched six of my companions drown to death, and I would have met the same fate with my child if it weren't for my ability to swim.

After being arrested in Tobruk, they took my money, phone, and passport. Others managed to hide some money. I was taken, along with my child and over 80 other migrants, including other children, to a large metal building at Jalianna Fishing Port in Benghazi. The sea was directly in front of us, surrounded by a tall fence. The facility was filled with armed soldiers, overseen by an officer they called "Afandi Ramzi." A colonel named Ali Al-Mishai would frequently visit the facility.

There were more than 300 detainees in a facility that measured no more than 1,200 square meters. We were given one meal a day, consisting of one or two plates of boiled pasta for every 10 to 15 detainees. Sometimes, we had to cook it with seawater after the tap water ran out. It was like animal feed. We ate it just to survive. After my release, I was shocked to find that my weight had dropped to 88 kilograms from about 117 kilograms, despite staying there for less than a month.

My child and I slept on the ground, laying out cardboard and pasta packaging bags they brought us on a floor filled with gravel and sewage water from the bathroom. Most of the detainees in the facility, including my child and I, suffered from contagious skin rashes. They would sell us allergy medication for around 100 euros a box.

The soldiers would enter with hoses and sticks, chasing and beating us randomly as if we were livestock. It seemed like a fun game to them, while my son watched everything and cried non-stop. I still fear that he will be haunted by what he witnessed there for the rest of his life. They would curse and insult us, and when one of us slapped a soldier for cursing at him, four other soldiers came with batons, wooden sticks, and plastic pipes. They dragged us to the door of the building and beat us relentlessly until they grew tired. "Ramzi" watched us without intervening. Since then, I have struggled *to move my arm, and I still have nightmares about that facility even after reaching a safe place.*”

**Moheeb (pseudonym)**

## IX. MASS GRAVES

110. Throughout the year, our field monitoring and documentation team recorded the discovery of 186 bodies in mass graves. It is believed that 120 of them belong to missing persons killed during the armed conflict since 2011, while 65 are thought to be migrants who perished while attempting to cross the Libyan desert. These mass graves were found in the cities of Tripoli, Sirte, Al-Shuwairif, and Tarhuna.

### *Tripoli*

111. Between October and November, 86 decomposed, unidentified bodies were discovered in a mass grave in Bir Al-Usta Milad, located in Tajoura, east of Tripoli. The bodies were exhumed by the General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons (GASIMP)<sup>72</sup>, under the GNU. It is believed that these remains belong to individuals who went missing and were killed during the 2011-armed conflict, which saw war crimes such as extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture—particularly in cities like Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi, and across eastern Libya.

### *Sirte*

112. Between July and August, 32 decomposed, unidentified bodies were found in mass graves in the Al-Giza Al-Bahriya area of Sirte. The bodies were retrieved by the GASIMP. It is believed that these remains belong to Libyans and foreign nationals who went missing and were killed between 2015 and 2016 during the period when the Islamic State ("ISIS") controlled the area. Families of victims have informed us that at least 65 people from the city remain missing, suggesting that more undiscovered mass graves may exist.

### *Tarhuna*

113. In December, three decomposed, unidentified bodies were discovered in a mass grave in the Wadi Washtata area, south of Tarhuna. The bodies were exhumed by the GASIMP. It is believed that they belong to missing persons from the city and other surrounding areas who were killed between 2013 and 2020 while Tarhuna was under the control of the Al-Kaniyat<sup>73</sup> militia. The group perpetrated extrajudicial executions that claimed the lives of hundreds of

<sup>72</sup> For more details on the recovery operations: [General Authority for Search and Identification of Missing Persons](#) Facebook page.

<sup>73</sup> Between 2017 and 2018, the "Al-Kaniyat" militia was integrated into the Presidential Guard Brigades under the decision of the Minister of Defence of the Government of National Accord, Resolution No. (13/2017), as part of the "7th Infantry Brigade." In August 2018, the Presidential Guard issued a statement distancing itself from the militia. In March 2019, the militia joined the Libyan Arab Armed Forces under the "9th Brigade."

[Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya](#), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024.



civilians, including entire families, women, and children<sup>74</sup>. In addition to mass killings, the Al-Kaniyat committed other international crimes, such as enforced disappearances, torture, and cruel treatment. These acts were often perpetrated based on political affiliation, wealth, suspected ties to the Government of National Accord (GNA), refusal to join the militia, attempts to uncover the fate of those the group had abducted, failure to attend the funeral of Mohsen al-Kani (one of the group's leaders), or even being suspected of rejoicing at his death<sup>75</sup>. As of January 2024, more than 350 bodies had been discovered in mass graves in Tarhuna and the surrounding areas<sup>76</sup>. Most of the victims had suffered gunshot wounds to the head and upper body<sup>77</sup>. This year, authorities identified the body of Hamza Mohamed Saqr<sup>78</sup>, a public prosecutor who had been missing since 2017. His remains were found in a mass grave in Tarhuna. In October 2024, the ICC unsealed arrest warrants for six senior members of the Al-Kaniyat militia on charges of war crimes<sup>79</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> [Detailed Findings on the Situation in Tarhuna](#), Independent Fact-Finding Mission, 1 July 2022.

<sup>76</sup> [Tarhuna - Mass Graves and Related Human Rights Violations and Related Abuses in Libya](#), United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 29 August 2024.

<sup>77</sup> [We Die a Thousand Times a Day: Impunity for Crimes Against Humanity in Tarhuna](#), Libya, Amnesty International, 2024, para. 60.

<sup>78</sup> [The Libyan Attorney General Issues an Obituary Regarding the Death of Public Prosecutor Hamza Mohammed Saqr After His Body Was Identified](#), Facebook, Office of the Attorney General – State of Libya, 19 May 2024.

<sup>79</sup> [Statement by ICC Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan on the Unsealing of Six Arrest Warrants in the Situation in Libya](#), International Criminal Court, 4 October 2024



## X. CONCLUSIONS

114. Most of the violations documented by the field team constitute gross violations of international human rights law. These include violations of the right to life, health, liberty, and personal security, as well as assaults on human dignity through torture, cruel and degrading treatment, enforced disappearance, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking. These violations have occurred in the broader context of restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression, assembly, association, thought, belief, religion, privacy, and the right to a fair trial. Such acts contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)<sup>80</sup> as well as numerous treaties ratified by Libya, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)<sup>81</sup>, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading

<sup>80</sup> The Charter affirms the right to life (Article 3); the prohibition of torture, and of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5); protection against arbitrary arrest or detention (Article 9); equality before the law and non-discrimination (Article 7); and the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20). [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#), 1948, United Nations.

<sup>81</sup> The Covenant affirms the right to life (Article 6); the prohibition of torture, and of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7); the right to liberty and personal security (Article 9); respect for the dignity of persons deprived of their liberty (Article 10); the right to a fair trial (Article 14); freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18); freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19); freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 21); and freedom of association (Article 22).

See: [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights](#), 1966, United Nations.

Treatment or Punishment (CAT)<sup>82</sup>, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)<sup>83</sup>. They also violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)<sup>84</sup> and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)<sup>85</sup>. These violations, in most cases, may amount to crimes against humanity, including wilful killing, imprisonment, or severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, cruel treatment, enforced disappearance, and human trafficking. Additionally, they contravene Libyan legislation, including the 2011 Constitutional Declaration and its amendments<sup>86</sup>, Law No. 10 of 2013 on the Criminalization of Torture and Enforced Disappearance<sup>87</sup>, and Law No. 6 of 2006 on the Judicial System<sup>88</sup> in Libya.

115. The Violations committed in the context of Military operations constitute grave breaches of Libya's obligations under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (GCs), their two Additional Protocols of 1977 (AP I & AP II), and customary<sup>89</sup> international principles. These violations include breaches of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Such violations have occurred in the context of the direct targeting of civilians, failure to take necessary precautions, lack of prior planning, failure to provide safe corridors for civilians, and insufficient efforts to minimise harm to them. They also include the use of landmines and

<sup>82</sup> The Convention affirms the right of every individual to be treated with humanity and dignity (Articles 1 and 16).

[Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment](#), 1984, United Nations.

<sup>83</sup> The Convention affirms the child's right to life and development (Article 6); protection from violence and abuse (Article 19), and the prohibition of torture, cruel treatment, or arbitrary detention (Article 37). [Convention on the Rights of the Child](#), 1989, United Nations.

<sup>84</sup> The Convention provides for the obligation of States to eliminate racial discrimination (Article 2) and to ensure equal enjoyment of all rights, including the rights to security of person and a fair trial (Article 5).

[International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination \(ICERD\)](#), 1984, United Nations.

<sup>85</sup> The Charter affirms the protection of the right to life (Article 4); the prohibition of torture, slavery, and cruel treatment (Article 5); the right to liberty and personal security (Article 6); and the right to a fair trial (Article 7). [African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights](#), 1981, African Union.

<sup>86</sup> The Constitutional Declaration affirms the state's obligation to protect human rights (Article 7) and guarantees a fair trial, respect for the rights of the accused, and equality before the law (Articles 1, 31).

[Libyan Constitutional Declaration of 2011 and its Amendments](#), 7 August 2014.

<sup>87</sup> The law prohibits and criminalises torture and enforced disappearance (Article 2).

[Law No. 10 of 2013 on the Criminalization of Torture, Enforced Disappearance, and Discrimination](#), General National Congress, 14 April 2013.

<sup>88</sup> The law affirms the independence of the judiciary and guarantees fair trial protections (Article 1), as well as the rights of the accused during trial (Article 92).

[Law No. 9 of 2006 on the Libyan Judicial System](#), 5 March 2006.

<sup>89</sup> Customary principles criminalize the violation of the right to life, mandate the distinction between military targets and civilians, uphold the principle of proportionality in the use of force, and ensure special protection for vulnerable groups such as women, children, and prisoners. [International Humanitarian Law Database: Customary Rules](#), International Committee of the Red Cross website.

non-compliance with obligations to disarm populated areas. Some of these violations may amount to war crimes, including the unlawful killing of civilians.

116. Based on our documentation compiled by the field monitoring and documentation team confirms that authorities in both eastern and western Libya—including the LAAF and affiliated armed groups, as well as security agencies under the Libyan government accredited by the HoR, and armed groups and security forces affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council and the GNU, are responsible for serious human rights violations and international crimes committed against civilians. This responsibility stems from issuing direct orders, allowing these violations to occur, being aware of them in areas under their control, or wilfully ignoring them without taking the necessary steps to prevent or hold perpetrators accountable.
117. Most of these violations were committed on a wide scale, following a systematic approach aimed at silencing actual and potential opponents of the authorities or their policies. This strategy was also used as a tool to suppress protesters, journalists, human rights defenders, political and community activists, as well as individuals who criticised or were perceived as critical of the authorities or their affiliates, and those deemed to be in violation of religious norms. In the context of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers' rights, authorities in both eastern and western Libya bear responsibility for serious violations, including extrajudicial killings, unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence, and human trafficking, including slavery. Many of these violations, due to their systematic and widespread nature, may amount to crimes against humanity and were committed in the context of exploiting or dehumanizing migrants.
118. Based on our Documentation, the LAAF and security agencies under the HoR-accredited Libyan government have committed serious violations in eastern and southern Libya. These include extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and other abuses that, due to their systematic and widespread nature, constitute crimes against humanity. Our findings indicate that most of these violations occurred within a structured chain of command or under direct supervision, beginning with Saddam Haftar, Commander of the Ground Forces, followed by Osama Al-Darsi, Head of the ISA for the HoR government, along with leaders of armed groups affiliated with the LAAF, allied militias, and security agencies under the HoR accredited government.
119. In the context of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, a pattern of coordinated arrests between the LAAF and the ISA under the HoR accredited government became evident over the past year. This collaboration included joint operations, coordinated efforts, and the transfer of detainees between cities via airbases controlled by the LAAF. Detainees were also moved between official and unofficial prisons run by the ISA, as well as facilities overseen by the Military Police and Prisons Administration and the TBZ Brigade, both affiliated with the LAAF.

120. In the context of extrajudicial killings and unlawful killings, our documentation confirms that the Military Police and Prisons Administration, under the management of Najib Balt, and the TBZ Brigade, under the effective command of Saddam Haftar, both affiliated with the LAAF, repeatedly allowed deliberate medical neglect of detainees in both official and unofficial prisons under their oversight. This pattern violated the detainees' right to life and health, with evidence being concealed, forensic reports manipulated or confiscated, and autopsies being obstructed. It has been confirmed through our documentation that the LAAF leadership was aware of these incidents and were the sole authorities responsible for approving the release of detainees for medical treatment. They failed to take any preventive measures, conduct investigations, or hold perpetrators accountable.
121. Our Documentation confirms that the ISA, under the leadership of Osama Al-Darsi, engaged in torture and deliberate medical neglect of detainees in the unofficial prisons under its control. This pattern violated the right to life, with evidence being concealed by confiscating forensic reports or obstructing autopsy examinations, in addition to preventing the victims' families from demanding investigations or holding the responsible parties accountable. In some cases, families were even forced to make false statements absolving the ISA of responsibility. It has been established that the ISA leadership was fully aware of the violations of the right to life in its prisons and is responsible for these violations, whether through command, oversight, or failure to take necessary measures to prevent, investigate, or hold perpetrators accountable.
122. In the context of military operations, documented violations confirm that the LAAF and the Wagner Group supporting them bear legal responsibility for the killing and injuring of civilians due to the use of anti-personnel landmines. This constitutes a breach of the principle of distinction, as they failed to take the necessary precautions by removing and clearing areas inhabited by civilians of explosive weapons, particularly in multiple areas south of Tripoli. These landmines continue to cause civilian casualties years later, representing a serious violation of international humanitarian law.
123. The Libyan HoR, led by Aqila Saleh, bears responsibility for the violations as the appointed authority of the LAAF's General commander and the body responsible for appointing the Libyan government and judiciary. This responsibility arises from its knowledge of the violations and its failure to fulfil its oversight role over the authorities it appointed, as well as its failure to take any action to prevent these violations or hold perpetrators accountable. Additionally, the HoR is complicit in providing legislation that legalises these violations, offering support and protection to those responsible and for the involvement of some of its members in these violations.
124. Security agencies and armed groups affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council and the GNU have also committed serious violations against civilians in western Libya, including extrajudicial killings, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detention,

among other abuses that, due to their systematic nature and wide scope, constitute crimes against humanity. We have documented the direct involvement of government officials in these violations, including the Head of the ISA, Lotfi Al-Hrari, the Prime Minister of the GNU and Minister of Defence, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, the Minister of the Interior, Imad Al-Tarablisi, and leaders of other armed groups and security agencies affiliated with the GNU and the Presidential Council. These leaders bear responsibility for the majority of these serious violations due to their confirmed knowledge of their occurrence and their failure to take any action to prevent them, investigate them, or hold the perpetrators accountable.

125. In the context of military operations, documented violations confirm that the GNU bears responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law due to the indiscriminate targeting of civilians during military operations conducted by armed groups and security agencies affiliated with or supporting it. This responsibility arises from the confirmed knowledge of the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure and the failure to take any action to prevent these violations, investigate them, or hold those responsible accountable.
126. Authorities in both eastern and western Libya have followed similar and repeated patterns of violations in the context of arbitrary detention. It has been established that the LAAF, the ISA, and Al-Radaa have relied on unfair trials to legitimise arbitrary detention. This included referring victims to biased judicial bodies, subjecting them to trials before quasi-judicial panels within prisons, relying on repealed or unlawful national legislation that violates international law, using false confessions or those extracted under torture or fabricated charges, and denying access to legal counsel.
127. Our Documentation confirms that the Libyan judiciary bears responsibility for serious human rights violations, including subjecting victims to unfair trials, relying on confessions obtained under torture, and failing to investigate reported violations such as extrajudicial killings, torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances. Additionally, the judiciary's failure to hold perpetrators accountable is a key factor. Some members of the judiciary have also been subjected to the influence of government figures, armed groups, and security agencies affiliated with the authorities in both eastern and western Libya.
128. Documented cases confirmed that government figures and entities are responsible for on serious violations against migrants, including extrajudicial killings, unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and torture; including the DCIM led by Mohamed Al-Khouja, the Border Guards led by Mohamed Al-Marhani, both under the Ministry of Interior of the GNU, the 20/20 Battalion commanded by Ali Al-Mishai, part of the TBZ Brigade affiliated with the LAAF, and other influential individuals and entities, including Member of HoR Ali Abu Zreiba, as well as leaders of armed groups and security agencies affiliated with or supporting the authorities in both eastern and western Libya.

129. Cases of migrants drowning and missing at sea also confirm that the authorities in eastern and western Libya bear responsibility for serious violations, where deliberate negligence in organising rescue operations and the absence of effective measures to ensure the safety of migrants led to drownings. The documented cases also confirm the authorities' knowledge of the involvement of armed groups and their affiliates in criminal networks active in smuggling and human trafficking, supervising smuggling journeys in dangerous conditions of severe overcrowding and lack of basic safety equipment, which exacerbated the drowning of migrants at sea; This makes the authorities in eastern and western Libya responsible for serious violations of the right to life that occurred at sea.
130. In the context of attacks against journalists, civil society, and activists, the authorities in eastern and western Libya have increasingly focused on targeting these groups, including human rights defenders, NGO workers, journalists, social media bloggers, and community activists. The ISA in both regions has primarily pursued these individuals, subjecting them to defamation campaigns, incitement, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment, and fabricated charges. This has led to a further shrinking of the civil space, with journalists and human rights defenders either temporarily or permanently halting their activities, shifting their focus, or being forced into self-censorship out of fear of prosecution.



## XI. RECOMMENDATIONS

### Authorities in Libya

#### *Libyan Attorney General*

- LCW calls on the Attorney General to immediately launch independent and transparent investigations into all documented violations, including cases of extrajudicial killings, deaths resulting from torture in detention facilities, arbitrary detentions, and enforced disappearances. These investigations must comply with international standards for fair trial as outlined in the ICCPR and ensure justice for all victims.
- LCW urges the Attorney General of Libya to conduct transparent and independent investigations into all attacks targeting religious groups, including followers of Sufi orders. They must take necessary measures to prevent these violations and ensure respect for these rights, in accordance with Libya's international obligations.
- LCW calls on the Attorney General of Libya to launch comprehensive and independent investigations into cases of human trafficking and to seek cooperation with the ICC to arrest those involved in these systematic and widespread practices that may amount to crimes against humanity, including the torture of migrants, using them in forced labour and slavery, and selling them through human trafficking and smuggling networks managed or facilitated by individuals linked to authorities in eastern and western Libya.
- LCW calls for independent investigations to identify those responsible for planting anti-personnel mines and to hold them accountable in accordance with international humanitarian law. Additionally, LCW calls for investigations into reports of the use of mercenaries, including members of the Wagner Group, in military operations that involved planting mines and using weapons prohibited under international law, leading to civilian casualties in populated areas. LCW asserts that planting mines in civilian areas constitutes a serious violation of international law, amounting to war crimes that warrant both national and international criminal accountability.

#### *Military Prosecutor*

- LCW calls on the Military Prosecutor to stop the trial of civilians before military courts, as this constitutes a violation of their right to a fair trial under the Geneva Conventions

and the ICCPR. LCW also demands that all civilians be tried before competent civilian courts in accordance with international standards for fair trials.

- Government of National Unity, the Presidential Council, the House of Representatives, the Government Accredited by the HoR, and the Libyan Armed Forces General Command.

***Government of National Unity, the Presidential Council, the House of Representatives, the Government Accredited by the HoR, and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces General Command***

***Arbitrary Detentions and Enforced Disappearances***

- LCW calls on the authorities in Libya to immediately and unconditionally release all arbitrarily detained individuals and to disclose the fate of the missing and those subjected to enforced disappearances in detention facilities under the control of the LAAF, the GNU, and the military, civil, and judicial institutions aligned with or loyal to them in eastern and southern Libya.

***Freedom of Opinion, Expression, and Peaceful Assembly***

- LCW calls on the authorities in Libya to respect and protect the right to freedom of opinion, expression, and peaceful assembly in accordance with Article 19 of the ICCPR. LCW also urges the immediate cessation of the enforcement of arbitrary laws that criminalise civil society activity, as well as all other legislation that enables security agencies, especially the ISA, to arrest, torture, and defame civilians and activists in particular.
- LCW calls on the authorities in Libya to stop the arbitrary detention campaigns targeting civil society activists. LCW demands the guarantee of the right to freedom of association in accordance with the ICCPR. The right to peacefully express opinions, protest, and engage in journalism must be respected.
- LCW calls on the authorities in eastern and western Libya to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of activists, human rights defenders, and journalists and to protect their right to freely carry out their work while halting all attacks or restrictions against them.

***Rescue and Protection of Migrants***

- LCW calls on the Libyan authorities to take immediate steps to protect migrants and refugees from serious violations, including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, torture,

and human trafficking. It also urges the cessation of cooperation with entities involved in these crimes and ensures accountability for those responsible.

- LCW calls on the authorities in Libya to establish effective and permanent search and rescue mechanisms along migration routes, at sea, and at land borders, in collaboration with relevant international and local organisations. Authorities must also halt any policies or practices that expose migrants to danger or lead to their forcible return or mass expulsions.
- LCW calls on the Libyan authorities to respect the dignity of deceased migrants and ensure their burial in a humane manner consistent with international standards. Effective measures should be taken to identify victims through DNA analysis and ensure that embassies and families of the deceased are notified of burial locations or their bodies repatriated to their home countries when possible.

### ***Religious Groups***

- LCW urges the authorities in Libya to respect and protect the right of all religious minorities to freely and safely practice their beliefs and religious rituals without fear of discrimination, violence, or persecution. Effective measures must be taken to prevent any form of violence, incitement, arbitrary detention, torture, or killing targeting minorities and to ensure accountability for those responsible for these violations.

### ***Mine Clearance and Explosive Weapon Prevention***

- LCW calls on the Libyan General Command of the LAAF to immediately disclose maps of minefields planted during military operations in Tripoli, Sirte, Jufra, and surrounding areas. The continued withholding of this information constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law and exposes civilians to danger.
- LCW urges the authorities in Libya to intensify efforts to remove landmines and unexploded ordnance, especially in populated areas, and ensure the provision of medical care and psychological and social rehabilitation for survivors. LCW also stresses the need to implement comprehensive awareness programmes for civilians, particularly children, about the risks posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance. Additionally, LCW emphasises the prohibition of using migrant workers in landmine removal or war debris clearance operations in areas that have not been properly cleared by competent authorities, as this would violate safety standards and workers' rights.

## ***Legislative Reform***

- LCW calls on the Libyan authorities to repeal or amend all laws and regulations that conflict with human rights and restrict fundamental freedoms, including the Anti-Cybercrime Law, the Anti-Witchcraft and Sorcery Law, the Counter-Terrorism Law, the Publications Law, and the Communications Law. These laws must align with international human rights standards, particularly concerning freedom of expression and the protection of individuals from unfair legal prosecution. The Libyan authorities must ensure that laws are not used as tools of repression or to restrict civil liberties but should instead promote human rights and the dignity of individuals in accordance with Libya's international obligations.

## **International Bodies**

### ***International Criminal Court (ICC)***

- LCW calls on the OTP of the ICC to continue investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Libya and to ensure that these investigations are not concluded by the end of 2025. The efforts to hold those responsible for these crimes accountable must be intensified, in line with the jurisdiction of the Court and the principles of international law as outlined in the Rome Statute.
- LCW urges the ICC to continue investigating crimes committed against migrants, given the ongoing and increasing violations against migrants and the inability of the national judiciary in Libya to hold perpetrators accountable, as well as the lack of national legislation to protect migrants and refugees.
- LCW calls on the ICC to exert pressure on the authorities in Libya and the State Parties to the Court to surrender individuals who have arrest warrants issued against them.

### ***United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)***

- LCW urges UNSMIL in Libya to intensify its efforts in pressuring all Libyan parties to ensure respect for and protection of human rights, prioritise strengthening transitional justice mechanisms, combat impunity, and support the national reconciliation process based on accountability. LCW emphasises the need for the mission to incorporate the protection of human rights and the engagement of civil society as a fundamental condition in any political dialogue, ensuring that the voices of victims and human rights defenders are heard and not marginalised in any future political process.

### ***Special Procedures***

- LCW urges the UN Special Procedures to prioritise the situation in Libya in their periodic reports and issue urgent calls to Libyan authorities to disclose the measures taken to address the violations documented in the report. LCW also calls on them to use their mandates to demand that Libyan authorities fulfil their international obligations, ensure accountability for those responsible for violations, and take tangible steps to protect victims and prevent further crimes.

## **Active States and Stakeholders Concerned with Libyan Affairs**

### ***Support for the Protection of Activists and Civil Society***

- LCW urges missions from influential countries in Libya to exert more pressure on Libyan parties to support civil society and activists, ensuring their commitment to international humanitarian law and international human rights law, especially in protecting activists, defenders, and civil society.
- LCW calls on active states to increase financial and technical support for independent human rights organisations in Libya, which contributes to strengthening efforts for accountability and justice. The lack of funding is a major barrier to the work of civil society organisations, undermining efforts to document violations and contributing to the continued deterioration of human rights, shrinking civil space, and entrenching impunity.

### ***Ending Support for Forced Returns and Violations Against Migrants***

- LCW urges European Union countries to halt financial and technical support provided to the Libyan Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Coast Guard under bilateral agreements, due to their direct role in the forced return of migrants to detention centres in Libya, where they face serious violations including torture, killing, exploitation, rape, and forced labour.
- LCW also calls on the European Union and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) to end cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard and prevent its use of European territorial waters as a tool to target migrants or obstruct rescue operations, in violation of international obligations to protect migrants' rights.

### ***Establishment of an International Investigation Mechanism***

- LCW urges active member states of the Human Rights Council (HRC) to support the establishment of an independent international investigation mechanism tasked with monitoring and documenting serious violations of international human rights law and

international humanitarian law in Libya as an alternative to the fact-finding mission (FFM), whose mandate has expired. The absence of an effective investigation mechanism deepens the crisis of impunity, providing cover for those responsible for violations to continue without deterrence.







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